The Frontlines Have Shifted: Explaining the Persistence of Pro-State Militias after Civil War

Many ceasefire and peace agreements stipulate the disarmament and demobilization of pro-state armed groups involved in the conflict, yet few of these groups ever completely demobilize. This study seeks to explain the process of incomplete demobilization by advancing a theoretical argument that pro-state armed groups are least likely to disarm and demobilize when the monopoly on violence is frag- mented, and when there is relative balance of capabilities and interests between the government and pro-state armed groups. Under these circumstances, both governments and pro-state armed groups may favor incomplete demobilization enabling them to pursue their strategic objectives. We draw on unique interview data with pro-state paramilitaries from Ukraine to empirically illustrate our theoretical expectations. or peace accords which stipulate demobilization of pro-government armed groups. This article presents a set of theoretical expectations which seek to explain the phenomenon of incomplete demobilization, drawing on a number of empirical examples before illustrating our theoretical