不信任动议:领导和反叛分裂

IF 1.7 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Journal of Global Security Studies Pub Date : 2020-10-07 DOI:10.1093/jogss/ogz060
A. Doctor
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引用次数: 21

摘要

为什么反叛组织在内战期间分裂成相互竞争的派系?为了解释这一结果,我利用了叛军领导层的变化。我认为叛军领导人借鉴了他们战前的经验。他们的军事和政治经验——在冲突中管理他们的组织。这些经历具有独特的反叛管理模式,因此也有相应的分裂风险。经验证据来自两阶段研究设计和1989年至2014年200多名反叛领导人的原始数据。在第一阶段,我用一系列的逻辑回归模型估计群体分裂的概率。在第二阶段,我使用Cox比例风险模型来估计领导对群体碎片化率的影响。结果表明,叛军领导层的变化与分裂的独特风险相对应。特别是,研究结果表明,拥有真正军事经验的领导人最能保持团队凝聚力。这项研究提供了对反叛组织分裂成武装派别的过程的见解。此外,它还对更广泛地讨论结构和机构在形成内战动态方面的作用作出了重要贡献。
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A Motion of No Confidence: Leadership and Rebel Fragmentation
Why do rebel organizations splinter into competing factions during civil war? To explain this outcome, I leverage variation in rebel leadership. I argue that rebel leaders draw on their pre-war experiences—i.e., their military and political experiences—to manage their organizations during conflict. These experiences bear unique patterns of rebel management and, thus, corresponding risks of fragmentation. Empirical evidence comes from a two-stage research design and original data featuring over 200 rebel leaders from 1989 to 2014. In the first stage, I estimate the probability of group fragmentation with a series of logistic regression models. In the second stage, I use Cox proportional-hazards models to estimate leadership effects on the rate of group fragmentation. Results indicate that variation in rebel leadership corresponds with unique risks of fragmentation. In particular, the results suggest that leaders with real military experience are best equipped to maintain group cohesion. This study offers insight into the processes by which rebel groups splinter into armed factions. In addition, it makes an important contribution to the broader discussion on the roles of structure and agency in shaping the dynamics of civil war.
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来源期刊
Journal of Global Security Studies
Journal of Global Security Studies INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-
CiteScore
3.30
自引率
6.20%
发文量
34
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