{"title":"孩子的难题,对抗和传闻","authors":"Richard D. Friedman","doi":"10.2307/1192372","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Richard D. Friedman (*) I INTRODUCTION The adjudication of child abuse claims poses an excruciatingly difficult conundrum. The crime is a terrible one, but false convictions are abhorrent. Often the evidence does not support a finding of guilt or innocence with sufficient clarity to allow a decision free of gnawing doubt. In many cases, a large part of the problem is that the prosecution's case depends critically on the statement or testimony of a young child. Even with respect to adult witnesses, the law of hearsay and confrontation is very perplexing, as anyone who has studied American evidentiary law and read Supreme Court opinions on the subject knows. Juxtaposing problems of hearsay and confrontation with those of child sexual abuse yields one of the most intractable problems that a system of criminal justice can face. II RESTRUCTURING THE GENERAL LAW OF CONFRONTATION AND HEARSAY I do not believe that our criminal justice system can reach a satisfactory resolution of the problems inherent in adjudicating claims of child abuse until it restructures the general law of confrontation and hearsay. (1) In Lilly v. Virginia, (2) I co-authored an amicus brief for the American Civil Liberties Union proposing a reconceptualization of the confrontation right. (3) Justice Breyer, one of the members of the plurality in that case, wrote a concurring opinion referring extensively to the brief and expressing considerable sympathy for the views advanced in it. (4) These views are in many ways compatible with those of Justices Scalia and Thomas. (5) Thus, it is plausible that in the reasonably near future the Court will revamp the Confrontation Clause along the lines suggested in the amicus brief. The current doctrine depends largely on the Court's perception that hearsay law and the confrontation right \"are generally designed to protect similar values and stem from the same roots.\" (6) Thus, the Court has tended to meld the two, treating both as aimed at facilitating accuracy in truth-finding by weeding out unreliable evidence. With respect to out-of-court statements, therefore, the Court has given the confrontation right very little ambit independent of hearsay law. If a statement fits within a \"firmly rooted\" hearsay exemption, (7) then the Confrontation Clause is unlikely to pose an obstacle to admissibility. (8) As a result, whether a statement by a child alieging sexual abuse should be admitted at the trial of the alleged abuser often depends on whether the court deems the statement to fit within one of the hearsay exemptions listed in the Federal Rules, a list purportedly determined by considerations of reliability. (9) This approach is objectionable on numerous grounds. A. The Difficulties of Determining Reliability Reliability is very difficult to determine. To confirm this point, we need look no further than the current debate over the reliability of child witnesses. (10) Any attempt to sort out reliable from unreliable evidence must run aground. If the determination is made according to broad categories of evidence, the law will be too blunt--not only sweeping in many statements that are not reliable, but also basing decisions on generalizations that may have little bearing on the particular case. If the determination is made case by case, it will not necessarily be any better. The determination will inevitably be very subjective, and it will be either effectively immune from appellate control or extremely demanding on appellate resources. As an example of how reliability testing does not work, consider the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on remand in United States v. Tome.\" The court held that a five-year-old girl's statements to pediatricians alleging that her father had sexually abused her more than a year before were within the hearsay exception. (12) Because the identity of the perpetrator was important information in determining whether there was a risk of sexually transmitted disease, the court concluded that the statements were made for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment, and therefore reliable for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. …","PeriodicalId":39484,"journal":{"name":"Law and Contemporary Problems","volume":"1 1","pages":"243-256"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2002-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Conundrum of Children, Confrontation, and Hearsay\",\"authors\":\"Richard D. Friedman\",\"doi\":\"10.2307/1192372\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Richard D. Friedman (*) I INTRODUCTION The adjudication of child abuse claims poses an excruciatingly difficult conundrum. The crime is a terrible one, but false convictions are abhorrent. Often the evidence does not support a finding of guilt or innocence with sufficient clarity to allow a decision free of gnawing doubt. In many cases, a large part of the problem is that the prosecution's case depends critically on the statement or testimony of a young child. Even with respect to adult witnesses, the law of hearsay and confrontation is very perplexing, as anyone who has studied American evidentiary law and read Supreme Court opinions on the subject knows. Juxtaposing problems of hearsay and confrontation with those of child sexual abuse yields one of the most intractable problems that a system of criminal justice can face. II RESTRUCTURING THE GENERAL LAW OF CONFRONTATION AND HEARSAY I do not believe that our criminal justice system can reach a satisfactory resolution of the problems inherent in adjudicating claims of child abuse until it restructures the general law of confrontation and hearsay. (1) In Lilly v. Virginia, (2) I co-authored an amicus brief for the American Civil Liberties Union proposing a reconceptualization of the confrontation right. (3) Justice Breyer, one of the members of the plurality in that case, wrote a concurring opinion referring extensively to the brief and expressing considerable sympathy for the views advanced in it. (4) These views are in many ways compatible with those of Justices Scalia and Thomas. (5) Thus, it is plausible that in the reasonably near future the Court will revamp the Confrontation Clause along the lines suggested in the amicus brief. The current doctrine depends largely on the Court's perception that hearsay law and the confrontation right \\\"are generally designed to protect similar values and stem from the same roots.\\\" (6) Thus, the Court has tended to meld the two, treating both as aimed at facilitating accuracy in truth-finding by weeding out unreliable evidence. With respect to out-of-court statements, therefore, the Court has given the confrontation right very little ambit independent of hearsay law. If a statement fits within a \\\"firmly rooted\\\" hearsay exemption, (7) then the Confrontation Clause is unlikely to pose an obstacle to admissibility. (8) As a result, whether a statement by a child alieging sexual abuse should be admitted at the trial of the alleged abuser often depends on whether the court deems the statement to fit within one of the hearsay exemptions listed in the Federal Rules, a list purportedly determined by considerations of reliability. (9) This approach is objectionable on numerous grounds. A. The Difficulties of Determining Reliability Reliability is very difficult to determine. To confirm this point, we need look no further than the current debate over the reliability of child witnesses. (10) Any attempt to sort out reliable from unreliable evidence must run aground. If the determination is made according to broad categories of evidence, the law will be too blunt--not only sweeping in many statements that are not reliable, but also basing decisions on generalizations that may have little bearing on the particular case. If the determination is made case by case, it will not necessarily be any better. The determination will inevitably be very subjective, and it will be either effectively immune from appellate control or extremely demanding on appellate resources. As an example of how reliability testing does not work, consider the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on remand in United States v. Tome.\\\" The court held that a five-year-old girl's statements to pediatricians alleging that her father had sexually abused her more than a year before were within the hearsay exception. (12) Because the identity of the perpetrator was important information in determining whether there was a risk of sexually transmitted disease, the court concluded that the statements were made for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment, and therefore reliable for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. …\",\"PeriodicalId\":39484,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Law and Contemporary Problems\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"243-256\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2002-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Law and Contemporary Problems\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2307/1192372\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"Social Sciences\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Law and Contemporary Problems","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1192372","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
摘要
对虐待儿童指控的裁决提出了一个令人难以忍受的难题。这是一种可怕的罪行,但错误的定罪是令人憎恶的。通常情况下,证据不足以清晰地支持有罪或无罪的判决,从而使裁决不存在令人痛苦的怀疑。在许多案件中,问题的很大一部分是,控方的案件严重依赖于一个年幼的孩子的陈述或证词。即使是对成年证人而言,道听途说和对抗法也非常令人困惑,任何研究过美国证据法并阅读过最高法院对此问题的意见的人都知道这一点。将传闻和对抗的问题与儿童性虐待的问题并置,是刑事司法系统可能面临的最棘手的问题之一。我不相信我们的刑事司法系统能够在裁决虐待儿童索赔的固有问题上达成令人满意的解决方案,除非它重构对抗和传闻的一般法则。在Lilly v. Virginia一案中,我为美国公民自由联盟(American Civil Liberties Union)共同撰写了一份法庭之友简报,提议对对抗权进行重新定义。(3)该案中占多数的法官之一布雷耶(Breyer)大法官撰写了一份同意意见,广泛参考了案情摘要,并对其中提出的观点表示了相当大的同情。(4)这些观点在许多方面与斯卡利亚和托马斯法官的观点一致。(5)因此,在不远的将来,法院将按照法庭之友摘要中建议的思路修改对抗条款,这是合理的。目前的原则在很大程度上取决于法院的看法,即传闻法和对抗权“通常是为了保护相似的价值观,并且源于相同的根源”。(6)因此,法院倾向于将两者结合起来,将两者都视为旨在通过排除不可靠的证据来促进查明真相的准确性。因此,就庭外陈述而言,本院赋予对抗权的范围非常小,不受传闻法的约束。如果一项陈述符合“根深蒂固”的道听途说豁免,那么对峙条款不太可能对可采性构成障碍。(8)因此,在对被指控的施虐者的审判中,儿童指控性虐待的陈述是否应被接受,往往取决于法院是否认为该陈述符合《联邦规则》中所列的道听途说豁免之一,这一清单据称是根据可靠性考虑而确定的。这种做法有许多理由值得反对。A.确定可靠性的困难可靠性很难确定。为了证实这一点,我们只需要看看目前关于儿童证人可靠性的辩论。任何将可靠证据与不可靠证据区分开来的企图都必须搁浅。如果裁决是根据广泛的证据类别做出的,法律就会过于生硬——不仅会笼统地提出许多不可靠的陈述,而且还会根据与具体案件几乎没有关系的概括来做出决定。如果根据具体情况作出决定,结果不一定会更好。这种决定将不可避免地非常主观,它将有效地免于上诉控制,或者对上诉资源的要求极高。作为可靠性测试如何不起作用的一个例子,请考虑第十巡回上诉法院在美国诉汤姆案中的还押判决。”法院认为,一名五岁女孩对儿科医生的陈述称,她的父亲在一年多前对她进行了性虐待,属于传闻例外。(12)由于犯罪者的身份是确定是否存在性传播疾病风险的重要信息,法院的结论是,这些陈述是为了医疗诊断和治疗而作的,因此就对抗条款而言是可靠的。…
The Conundrum of Children, Confrontation, and Hearsay
Richard D. Friedman (*) I INTRODUCTION The adjudication of child abuse claims poses an excruciatingly difficult conundrum. The crime is a terrible one, but false convictions are abhorrent. Often the evidence does not support a finding of guilt or innocence with sufficient clarity to allow a decision free of gnawing doubt. In many cases, a large part of the problem is that the prosecution's case depends critically on the statement or testimony of a young child. Even with respect to adult witnesses, the law of hearsay and confrontation is very perplexing, as anyone who has studied American evidentiary law and read Supreme Court opinions on the subject knows. Juxtaposing problems of hearsay and confrontation with those of child sexual abuse yields one of the most intractable problems that a system of criminal justice can face. II RESTRUCTURING THE GENERAL LAW OF CONFRONTATION AND HEARSAY I do not believe that our criminal justice system can reach a satisfactory resolution of the problems inherent in adjudicating claims of child abuse until it restructures the general law of confrontation and hearsay. (1) In Lilly v. Virginia, (2) I co-authored an amicus brief for the American Civil Liberties Union proposing a reconceptualization of the confrontation right. (3) Justice Breyer, one of the members of the plurality in that case, wrote a concurring opinion referring extensively to the brief and expressing considerable sympathy for the views advanced in it. (4) These views are in many ways compatible with those of Justices Scalia and Thomas. (5) Thus, it is plausible that in the reasonably near future the Court will revamp the Confrontation Clause along the lines suggested in the amicus brief. The current doctrine depends largely on the Court's perception that hearsay law and the confrontation right "are generally designed to protect similar values and stem from the same roots." (6) Thus, the Court has tended to meld the two, treating both as aimed at facilitating accuracy in truth-finding by weeding out unreliable evidence. With respect to out-of-court statements, therefore, the Court has given the confrontation right very little ambit independent of hearsay law. If a statement fits within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exemption, (7) then the Confrontation Clause is unlikely to pose an obstacle to admissibility. (8) As a result, whether a statement by a child alieging sexual abuse should be admitted at the trial of the alleged abuser often depends on whether the court deems the statement to fit within one of the hearsay exemptions listed in the Federal Rules, a list purportedly determined by considerations of reliability. (9) This approach is objectionable on numerous grounds. A. The Difficulties of Determining Reliability Reliability is very difficult to determine. To confirm this point, we need look no further than the current debate over the reliability of child witnesses. (10) Any attempt to sort out reliable from unreliable evidence must run aground. If the determination is made according to broad categories of evidence, the law will be too blunt--not only sweeping in many statements that are not reliable, but also basing decisions on generalizations that may have little bearing on the particular case. If the determination is made case by case, it will not necessarily be any better. The determination will inevitably be very subjective, and it will be either effectively immune from appellate control or extremely demanding on appellate resources. As an example of how reliability testing does not work, consider the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on remand in United States v. Tome." The court held that a five-year-old girl's statements to pediatricians alleging that her father had sexually abused her more than a year before were within the hearsay exception. (12) Because the identity of the perpetrator was important information in determining whether there was a risk of sexually transmitted disease, the court concluded that the statements were made for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment, and therefore reliable for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. …
期刊介绍:
Law and Contemporary Problems was founded in 1933 and is the oldest journal published at Duke Law School. It is a quarterly, interdisciplinary, faculty-edited publication of Duke Law School. L&CP recognizes that many fields in the sciences, social sciences, and humanities can enhance the development and understanding of law. It is our purpose to seek out these areas of overlap and to publish balanced symposia that enlighten not just legal readers, but readers from these other disciplines as well. L&CP uses a symposium format, generally publishing one symposium per issue on a topic of contemporary concern. Authors and articles are selected to ensure that each issue collectively creates a unified presentation of the contemporary problem under consideration. L&CP hosts an annual conference at Duke Law School featuring the authors of one of the year’s four symposia.