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引用次数: 59

摘要

鉴于CEO拥有大量的股票投资组合,最近关于CEO激励的许多文献认为,基于现金的奖金计划在很大程度上是无关紧要的,这就回避了一个问题:为什么几乎所有的CEO薪酬计划都包括这种奖金?我们开发了一种新的奖金计划激励措施,并表明绩效敏感性远远大于先前的估计。我们还测试了关于奖金在为高管提供个人和团队激励方面的作用的假设。我们发现很少有证据支持个性化激励假说,但发现一致的证据表明,奖金计划似乎被用来鼓励相互监督,并促进整个高层管理团队的协调。
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The Role of Executive Cash Bonuses in Providing Individual and Team Incentives
Abstract Given CEOs’ substantial equity portfolios, much recent literature on CEO incentives regards cash-based bonus plans as largely irrelevant, begging the question of why nearly all CEO compensation plans include such bonuses. We develop a new measure of bonus plan incentives and show that performance sensitivities are much greater than prior estimates. We also test hypotheses regarding the role of bonuses in providing executives with individualized and team incentives. We find little evidence supporting the individualized incentives hypotheses but find consistent evidence that bonus plans appear to be used to encourage mutual monitoring and to facilitate coordination across the top management team as a whole.
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