{"title":"为什么要征收反补贴税?公司的观点","authors":"Yu-Ter Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1486602","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the relationship between firms’ profits and countervailing duties in vertically related markets characterized by oligopolies. It is shown that a countervailing duty equal to the foreign export subsidy is required to neutralize the impact of foreign export subsidies on the domestic firms’ profits. The domestic country has an incentive to impose a countervailing duty on the foreign final good even though the foreign government only subsidizes exports of the intermediate good. Additionally, the foreign exporting firms may benefit from a countervailing duty more than a foreign export subsidy.","PeriodicalId":14396,"journal":{"name":"International Trade","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2009-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Why are Countervailing Duties Imposed? The Firms’ Viewpoint\",\"authors\":\"Yu-Ter Wang\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1486602\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper studies the relationship between firms’ profits and countervailing duties in vertically related markets characterized by oligopolies. It is shown that a countervailing duty equal to the foreign export subsidy is required to neutralize the impact of foreign export subsidies on the domestic firms’ profits. The domestic country has an incentive to impose a countervailing duty on the foreign final good even though the foreign government only subsidizes exports of the intermediate good. Additionally, the foreign exporting firms may benefit from a countervailing duty more than a foreign export subsidy.\",\"PeriodicalId\":14396,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Trade\",\"volume\":\"32 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2009-10-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Trade\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1486602\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Trade","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1486602","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Why are Countervailing Duties Imposed? The Firms’ Viewpoint
This paper studies the relationship between firms’ profits and countervailing duties in vertically related markets characterized by oligopolies. It is shown that a countervailing duty equal to the foreign export subsidy is required to neutralize the impact of foreign export subsidies on the domestic firms’ profits. The domestic country has an incentive to impose a countervailing duty on the foreign final good even though the foreign government only subsidizes exports of the intermediate good. Additionally, the foreign exporting firms may benefit from a countervailing duty more than a foreign export subsidy.