{"title":"在行政机关执行程序中作为裁决者的控告者","authors":"Andrew N. Vollmer","doi":"10.36646/mjlr.52.1.accusers","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Largely because of the Supreme Court’s 1975 decision in Withrow v. Larkin, the accepted view for decades has been that a federal administrative agency does not violate the Due Process Clause by combining the functions of investigating, charging, and then resolving allegations that a person violated the law. Many federal agencies have this structure, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Federal Trade Commission.\n\nIn 2016, the Supreme Court decided Williams v. Pennsylvania, a judicial disqualification case that, without addressing administrative agencies, nonetheless raises a substantial question about one aspect of the combination of functions at agencies. The Court held that due process prevented a judge from sitting in a case in which he had participated as district attorney years earlier. The operative principle for the decision was that “the Court has determined that an unconstitutional potential for bias exists when the same person serves as both accuser and adjudicator in a case.”\n\nThis Article concludes that the reasoning of Williams should supersede Withrow on the need to disqualify a specific commissioner or agency head from participating in a particular adjudication if the agency official played a meaningful role, such as voting to approve enforcement charges, in the process leading to the agency’s initiation of proceedings against the defendant. Voting to approve enforcement charges would be a meaningful role. The due process cases do not permit a compromise on the high standards of impartiality demanded of a final agency decision maker in an adjudication to determine whether a private party committed a violation of law.\n\nThat reading of Williams threatens to unsettle standard practices at various agencies, but a closer look at the procedures of the SEC shows that it would be able to accommodate the rule in Williams yet retain the combination of charging and adjudicating at the Commission level. Because of turnover of Commissioners and quorum rules, the SEC could continue to have the agency leaders bring enforcement cases and review nearly all administrative law judge decisions while disqualifying individual Commissioners under Williams when necessary.","PeriodicalId":83420,"journal":{"name":"University of Michigan journal of law reform. University of Michigan. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
很大程度上是因为最高法院1975年对威斯罗诉拉金案的判决,几十年来人们接受的观点是,联邦行政机构将调查、起诉和解决某人违法指控的职能结合起来,并不违反正当程序条款。许多联邦机构都有这种结构,如证券交易委员会(SEC)和联邦贸易委员会。2016年,最高法院判决了威廉姆斯诉宾夕法尼亚州案(Williams v. Pennsylvania),这是一起司法资格取消案,虽然没有涉及行政机构,但却对机构职能组合的一个方面提出了实质性问题。法院认为,正当程序阻止法官审理他多年前作为地区检察官参与的案件。该判决的执行原则是,“法院认定,当同一个人同时担任案件的原告和审判者时,存在违宪的偏见可能性。”本文的结论是,Williams的推理应取代Withrow,即如果某一特定专员或机构负责人在导致该机构对被告提起诉讼的过程中发挥了有意义的作用,例如投票批准执法指控,则该机构需要取消其参与特定裁决的资格。投票批准强制收费将是一个有意义的角色。正当程序案件不允许在裁决中对最终机构决策者在确定私人当事人是否违法时所要求的高度公正性标准作出妥协。对威廉姆斯案的这种解读可能会扰乱各机构的标准做法,但仔细研究SEC的程序就会发现,它能够适应威廉姆斯案的规则,同时在委员会层面保留起诉和裁决的结合。由于委员的更替和法定人数规则,SEC可以继续让机构领导人提起执法案件,审查几乎所有行政法法官的决定,同时在必要时取消威廉姆斯手下个别委员的资格。
Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings
Largely because of the Supreme Court’s 1975 decision in Withrow v. Larkin, the accepted view for decades has been that a federal administrative agency does not violate the Due Process Clause by combining the functions of investigating, charging, and then resolving allegations that a person violated the law. Many federal agencies have this structure, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Federal Trade Commission.
In 2016, the Supreme Court decided Williams v. Pennsylvania, a judicial disqualification case that, without addressing administrative agencies, nonetheless raises a substantial question about one aspect of the combination of functions at agencies. The Court held that due process prevented a judge from sitting in a case in which he had participated as district attorney years earlier. The operative principle for the decision was that “the Court has determined that an unconstitutional potential for bias exists when the same person serves as both accuser and adjudicator in a case.”
This Article concludes that the reasoning of Williams should supersede Withrow on the need to disqualify a specific commissioner or agency head from participating in a particular adjudication if the agency official played a meaningful role, such as voting to approve enforcement charges, in the process leading to the agency’s initiation of proceedings against the defendant. Voting to approve enforcement charges would be a meaningful role. The due process cases do not permit a compromise on the high standards of impartiality demanded of a final agency decision maker in an adjudication to determine whether a private party committed a violation of law.
That reading of Williams threatens to unsettle standard practices at various agencies, but a closer look at the procedures of the SEC shows that it would be able to accommodate the rule in Williams yet retain the combination of charging and adjudicating at the Commission level. Because of turnover of Commissioners and quorum rules, the SEC could continue to have the agency leaders bring enforcement cases and review nearly all administrative law judge decisions while disqualifying individual Commissioners under Williams when necessary.