{"title":"承诺与审查谈判:从京都到巴黎","authors":"Bård Harstad","doi":"10.1093/ej/ueac076","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n A tractable dynamic model of international climate policies is analysed. Different bargaining games influence participation levels, emission quotas, and technology investment levels. I derive several predictions which are arguably consistent with the differences between the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement – including the transitioning from the former to the latter.","PeriodicalId":85686,"journal":{"name":"The Economic journal of Nepal","volume":"1 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Pledge-and-Review Bargaining: From Kyoto to Paris\",\"authors\":\"Bård Harstad\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/ej/ueac076\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n A tractable dynamic model of international climate policies is analysed. Different bargaining games influence participation levels, emission quotas, and technology investment levels. I derive several predictions which are arguably consistent with the differences between the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement – including the transitioning from the former to the latter.\",\"PeriodicalId\":85686,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Economic journal of Nepal\",\"volume\":\"1 4\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-11-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Economic journal of Nepal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueac076\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Economic journal of Nepal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueac076","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
A tractable dynamic model of international climate policies is analysed. Different bargaining games influence participation levels, emission quotas, and technology investment levels. I derive several predictions which are arguably consistent with the differences between the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement – including the transitioning from the former to the latter.
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