国际航空公司联盟定价:一项回顾性研究

IF 2.2 3区 工程技术 Q2 ECONOMICS Economics of Transportation Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI:10.1016/j.ecotra.2019.100139
Jan K. Brueckner , Ethan Singer
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引用次数: 19

摘要

本研究为国际航空公司联盟定价提供了进一步的实证证据。这篇论文涵盖了从1997年到2016年的较长样本时期,它用美国航空公司的外国联盟合作伙伴报告的机密票价数据补充了美国交通部通常的票价数据。连接服务的实证结果与先前的发现相吻合,联盟收取的票价低于不结盟航空公司。与之前几乎所有的研究相反,网关对网关的研究结果表明,在样本期的后半段,给予两家先前不结盟的航空公司反垄断豁免权,相当于消除了一个竞争对手,从而导致票价上涨。然而,基于结果的模拟表明,这种反竞争效应被连接乘客的收益所抵消,使得联盟总体上是有益的。
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Pricing by international airline alliances: A retrospective study

This study provides further empirical evidence on pricing by international airline alliances. The paper covers a long sample period, which runs from 1997 to 2016, and it supplements the usual USDOT fare data with confidential fare data reported by the foreign alliance partners of US carriers. The empirical results for connecting service match earlier findings, with alliances charging lower fares than nonaligned carriers. In contrast to almost all previous studies, the gateway-to-gateway results imply that, in the latter part of the sample period, granting antitrust immunity to two previously nonaligned carriers is equivalent to removing a competitor, with a consequent increase in fares. However, a simulation based on the results shows that this anticompetitive effect is more than offset by gains to connecting passengers, making alliances beneficial on balance.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.50
自引率
7.10%
发文量
19
审稿时长
69 days
期刊最新文献
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