Why we have duties of autonomy towards marginal agents.

Patients are usually granted autonomy rights, including the right to consent to or refuse treatment. These rights are commonly attributed to patients if they fulfil certain conditions. For example, a patient must sufficiently understand the information given to them before making a treatment decision. On the one hand, there is a large group of patients who meet these conditions. On the other hand, there is a group that clearly does not meet these conditions, including comatose patients or patients in the late stages of Alzheimer's disease. Then there is a group of patients who fall into the range in between. At the lower end of this range are so-called 'marginal agents,' which include young children and patients in the middle stages of Alzheimer's disease. They also do not meet the typical requirements for autonomy, which is why they are usually granted fewer autonomy rights. However, some of them are capable of 'pre-forms' of autonomy that express what is important to them. These pre-forms differ from mere desires and reflect the identification/authenticity condition of autonomy. They have something in common with autonomous attitudes, choices, and actions - namely, they express the value of autonomy. As I will argue, autonomy is a value worthy of protection and promotion - even in its non-reflexive forms. Against this background, it becomes clear why we have autonomy duties, more precisely positive, autonomy-enabling duties, towards marginal agents and why we should give them as much attention as autonomy duties towards competent patients.