{"title":"儿科护理的痛苦和困境:对泰勒·泰特的回应。","authors":"Brent Michael Kious","doi":"10.1007/s11017-023-09615-5","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In a recent article, Tyler Tate argues that the suffering of children - especially children with severe cognitive impairments - should be regarded as the antithesis of flourishing, where flourishing is relative to one's individual characteristics and essentially involves receiving care from others. Although initially persuasive, Tate's theory is ambiguous in several ways, leading to significant conceptual problems. By identifying flourishing with receiving care, Tate raises questions about the importance of care that he does not address, giving rise to a bootstrapping problem. By making flourishing relative to an individual's circumstances, Tate is forced to confront questions about exactly how relative it can be, suggesting the possibility that, on his view, to flourish is simply to be however one is. In an attempt to surmount these problems, I offer a revision and restatement of Tate's view that defines the relationship between individualized flourishing and the more conventional, species-relative concept, and describe more clearly the role that care should play with respect to flourishing - one that is instrumental and not merely constitutive. Even this restated view, however, fails to answer difficult questions about how one should respond to the medical needs of some children, highlighting the fact that a conceptual analysis of suffering may do little, in the end, to untangle ethical dilemmas in the care of severely ill children.</p>","PeriodicalId":46703,"journal":{"name":"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics","volume":"44 3","pages":"249-258"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Suffering and the dilemmas of pediatric care: a response to Tyler Tate.\",\"authors\":\"Brent Michael Kious\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s11017-023-09615-5\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>In a recent article, Tyler Tate argues that the suffering of children - especially children with severe cognitive impairments - should be regarded as the antithesis of flourishing, where flourishing is relative to one's individual characteristics and essentially involves receiving care from others. Although initially persuasive, Tate's theory is ambiguous in several ways, leading to significant conceptual problems. By identifying flourishing with receiving care, Tate raises questions about the importance of care that he does not address, giving rise to a bootstrapping problem. By making flourishing relative to an individual's circumstances, Tate is forced to confront questions about exactly how relative it can be, suggesting the possibility that, on his view, to flourish is simply to be however one is. In an attempt to surmount these problems, I offer a revision and restatement of Tate's view that defines the relationship between individualized flourishing and the more conventional, species-relative concept, and describe more clearly the role that care should play with respect to flourishing - one that is instrumental and not merely constitutive. Even this restated view, however, fails to answer difficult questions about how one should respond to the medical needs of some children, highlighting the fact that a conceptual analysis of suffering may do little, in the end, to untangle ethical dilemmas in the care of severely ill children.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":46703,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics\",\"volume\":\"44 3\",\"pages\":\"249-258\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"3\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-023-09615-5\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ETHICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics","FirstCategoryId":"3","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-023-09615-5","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Suffering and the dilemmas of pediatric care: a response to Tyler Tate.
In a recent article, Tyler Tate argues that the suffering of children - especially children with severe cognitive impairments - should be regarded as the antithesis of flourishing, where flourishing is relative to one's individual characteristics and essentially involves receiving care from others. Although initially persuasive, Tate's theory is ambiguous in several ways, leading to significant conceptual problems. By identifying flourishing with receiving care, Tate raises questions about the importance of care that he does not address, giving rise to a bootstrapping problem. By making flourishing relative to an individual's circumstances, Tate is forced to confront questions about exactly how relative it can be, suggesting the possibility that, on his view, to flourish is simply to be however one is. In an attempt to surmount these problems, I offer a revision and restatement of Tate's view that defines the relationship between individualized flourishing and the more conventional, species-relative concept, and describe more clearly the role that care should play with respect to flourishing - one that is instrumental and not merely constitutive. Even this restated view, however, fails to answer difficult questions about how one should respond to the medical needs of some children, highlighting the fact that a conceptual analysis of suffering may do little, in the end, to untangle ethical dilemmas in the care of severely ill children.
期刊介绍:
AIMS & SCOPE
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics examines clinical judgment and reasoning, medical concepts such as health and disease, the philosophical basis of medical science, and the philosophical ethics of health care and biomedical research
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics is an international forum for interdisciplinary studies in the ethics of health care and in the philosophy and methodology of medical practice and biomedical research. Coverage in the philosophy of medicine includes the theoretical examination of clinical judgment and decision making; theories of health promotion and preventive care; the problems of medical language and knowledge acquisition; theory formation in medicine; analysis of the structure and dynamics of medical hypotheses and theories; discussion and clarification of basic medical concepts and issues; medical application of advanced methods in the philosophy of science, and the interplay between medicine and other scientific or social institutions. Coverage of ethics includes both clinical and research ethics, with an emphasis on underlying ethical theory rather than institutional or governmental policy analysis. All philosophical methods and orientations receive equal consideration. The journal pays particular attention to developing new methods and tools for analysis and understanding of the conceptual and ethical presuppositions of the medical sciences and health care processes.
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics publishes original scholarly articles, occasional special issues on important topics, and book reviews.
Related subjects » Applied Ethics & Social Responsibility – Bioethics – Ethics – Epistemology & Philosophy of Science – Medical Ethics – Medicine – Philosophy – Philosophy of Medicine – Surgery