Yichen Li, YingQiao Wang, Tal Boger, Kevin A Smith, Samuel J Gershman, Tomer D Ullman
{"title":"物体的近似表示是物理推理的基础。","authors":"Yichen Li, YingQiao Wang, Tal Boger, Kevin A Smith, Samuel J Gershman, Tomer D Ullman","doi":"10.1037/xge0001439","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>People make fast and reasonable predictions about the physical behavior of everyday objects. To do so, people may use principled mental shortcuts, such as object simplification, similar to models developed by engineers for real-time physical simulations. We hypothesize that people use simplified object approximations for tracking and action (the <i>body</i> representation), as opposed to fine-grained forms for visual recognition (the <i>shape</i> representation). We used three classic psychophysical tasks (causality perception, time-to-collision, and change detection) in novel settings that dissociate body and shape. People's behavior across tasks indicates that they rely on coarse bodies for physical reasoning, which lies between convex hulls and fine-grained shapes. Our empirical and computational findings shed light on basic representations people use to understand everyday dynamics, and how these representations differ from those used for recognition. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":"3074-3086"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"An approximate representation of objects underlies physical reasoning.\",\"authors\":\"Yichen Li, YingQiao Wang, Tal Boger, Kevin A Smith, Samuel J Gershman, Tomer D Ullman\",\"doi\":\"10.1037/xge0001439\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>People make fast and reasonable predictions about the physical behavior of everyday objects. To do so, people may use principled mental shortcuts, such as object simplification, similar to models developed by engineers for real-time physical simulations. We hypothesize that people use simplified object approximations for tracking and action (the <i>body</i> representation), as opposed to fine-grained forms for visual recognition (the <i>shape</i> representation). We used three classic psychophysical tasks (causality perception, time-to-collision, and change detection) in novel settings that dissociate body and shape. People's behavior across tasks indicates that they rely on coarse bodies for physical reasoning, which lies between convex hulls and fine-grained shapes. Our empirical and computational findings shed light on basic representations people use to understand everyday dynamics, and how these representations differ from those used for recognition. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":15698,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"3074-3086\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"102\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001439\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"心理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"2023/6/12 0:00:00\",\"PubModel\":\"Epub\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001439","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2023/6/12 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL","Score":null,"Total":0}
An approximate representation of objects underlies physical reasoning.
People make fast and reasonable predictions about the physical behavior of everyday objects. To do so, people may use principled mental shortcuts, such as object simplification, similar to models developed by engineers for real-time physical simulations. We hypothesize that people use simplified object approximations for tracking and action (the body representation), as opposed to fine-grained forms for visual recognition (the shape representation). We used three classic psychophysical tasks (causality perception, time-to-collision, and change detection) in novel settings that dissociate body and shape. People's behavior across tasks indicates that they rely on coarse bodies for physical reasoning, which lies between convex hulls and fine-grained shapes. Our empirical and computational findings shed light on basic representations people use to understand everyday dynamics, and how these representations differ from those used for recognition. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Experimental Psychology: General publishes articles describing empirical work that bridges the traditional interests of two or more communities of psychology. The work may touch on issues dealt with in JEP: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, JEP: Human Perception and Performance, JEP: Animal Behavior Processes, or JEP: Applied, but may also concern issues in other subdisciplines of psychology, including social processes, developmental processes, psychopathology, neuroscience, or computational modeling. Articles in JEP: General may be longer than the usual journal publication if necessary, but shorter articles that bridge subdisciplines will also be considered.