Optimal Incentive Wage Contracts under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

Jianzhang Li
{"title":"Optimal Incentive Wage Contracts under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard","authors":"Jianzhang Li","doi":"10.1109/ITAPP.2010.5566526","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we study the problem in which a risk-neutral principal design optimal incentive wage contracts for a risk-averse agent under asymmetric information.Using the theories and methods of dynamic programming and optimal control and mechanism design,the characteristics and some interesting comparative static of optimal linear incentive wage contracts have been obtained in simultaneous adverse selection and moral hazard .we show that the higher the capacity of an agent, he was more hard work. Moreover,the optimal contract for the higher ability agent is higher energy incentive or higher risk for screening the ability of agents.","PeriodicalId":116013,"journal":{"name":"2010 International Conference on Internet Technology and Applications","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2010 International Conference on Internet Technology and Applications","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ITAPP.2010.5566526","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

In this paper, we study the problem in which a risk-neutral principal design optimal incentive wage contracts for a risk-averse agent under asymmetric information.Using the theories and methods of dynamic programming and optimal control and mechanism design,the characteristics and some interesting comparative static of optimal linear incentive wage contracts have been obtained in simultaneous adverse selection and moral hazard .we show that the higher the capacity of an agent, he was more hard work. Moreover,the optimal contract for the higher ability agent is higher energy incentive or higher risk for screening the ability of agents.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
逆向选择和道德风险下的最优激励工资契约
研究了信息不对称条件下风险中性委托人为风险厌恶代理人设计最优激励工资契约的问题。运用动态规划、最优控制和机制设计的理论和方法,研究了在逆向选择和道德风险并存的情况下,最优线性激励工资契约的特征和一些有趣的比较静态,表明代理人的能力越高,他就越努力。而且,对于高能力的代理,最优契约是更高的能量激励或更高的筛选代理能力的风险。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
The Application of Multimedia Courses in Academic Library Freshmen Instruction A New Operation Model of E-Business Incentive Mechanism Design on Human Capital Pricing of Enterprise A LDA-Based Approach for Interactive Web Mining of Topic Evolutionary Patterns Design and Implementation of Remote Parallel Computing System Based on Multi-Platform
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1