{"title":"Wholesale Price Discrimination and Parallel Imports","authors":"Mattias Ganslandt, K. Maskus","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.968697","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We develop a model of vertical pricing in which an original manufacturer sets wholesale prices in two markets integrated at the distributor level by parallel imports (PI). In this context we show that if competition policy requires uniform wholesale prices across locations it would push retail prices toward convergence as transportation costs fall. However, these retail prices could be higher than those induced without restrictions on prices charged to distributors. Thus, the competition policy may not be optimal for consumer welfare.","PeriodicalId":303916,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Public Policy (Other) (Law) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2007-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"71","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERPN: Public Policy (Other) (Law) (Sub-Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.968697","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 71
Abstract
We develop a model of vertical pricing in which an original manufacturer sets wholesale prices in two markets integrated at the distributor level by parallel imports (PI). In this context we show that if competition policy requires uniform wholesale prices across locations it would push retail prices toward convergence as transportation costs fall. However, these retail prices could be higher than those induced without restrictions on prices charged to distributors. Thus, the competition policy may not be optimal for consumer welfare.
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