Ana Clara Zoppi Serpa, Giuliano Sider, Hayato Fujii, Félix Carvalho Rodrigues, R. Dahab, Julio López
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
The white box threat model considers an attacker with complete access to the implementation and execution environment of a cryptographic algorithm. Aiming towards secure implementation of cryptographic algorithms in this context, several implementations of the AES cipher were proposed in the literature. However, they were proven vulnerable to implementation specific attacks, as well as to refined side-channel and more robust attacks that do not rely on implementation knowledge of the cipher, such as DCA (differential computation analysis). In this paper we present a white box implementation of the AES cipher with recently proposed DCA countermeasures [Lee et al. 2018]. We provide a comparison of the performance difference these countermeasures incur in practice and report some preliminary experimental results on the security of our implementation.
白盒威胁模型认为攻击者可以完全访问加密算法的实现和执行环境。为了在这种情况下安全实现加密算法,文献中提出了AES密码的几种实现方法。然而,它们被证明容易受到特定于实现的攻击,以及不依赖于密码实现知识的改进侧信道和更强大的攻击,例如DCA(差分计算分析)。在本文中,我们提出了AES密码的白盒实现以及最近提出的DCA对策[Lee et al. 2018]。我们提供了这些对策在实践中产生的性能差异的比较,并报告了我们实施的安全性的一些初步实验结果。