On Two-sided Matching in Infinite Markets

Yunseo Choi
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Abstract

We extend a number of classic results for finite one-to-one matching markets, such as group strategy-proofness, entry comparative statics, and respect for unambiguous improvements, to infinite markets via the compactness theorem of propositional logic. In addition, we show that two versions of the lattice structure of finite one-to-one matching markets carry over to infinite markets. At the same time, we prove that other results, such as weak Pareto optimality and strong stability property, do not extend to infinite markets.
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无限市场中的双面匹配
通过命题逻辑的紧性定理,我们将有限一对一匹配市场的一些经典结果,如群体策略的证明性、进入比较静力学和对无歧义改进的尊重,推广到无限市场。此外,我们还证明了有限一对一匹配市场的晶格结构的两个版本可以延续到无限市场。同时,证明了弱Pareto最优性和强稳定性等其他结果在无限市场上不成立。
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