Detection of Inconsistencies in Privacy Practices of Browser Extensions

D. Bui, Brian Tang, K. Shin
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

All major web browsers support extensions to provide additional functionalities and enhance users’ browsing experience while the extensions can access and collect users’ data during their web browsing. Although the web extensions inform users of their data practices via multiple forms of notices, prior work has overlooked the critical gap between the actual data practices and the published privacy notices of browser extensions. To fill this gap, we propose ExtPrivA that automatically detects the inconsistencies between browser extensions’ data collection and their privacy disclosures. From the privacy policies and Dashboard disclosures, ExtPrivA extracts privacy statements to have a clear interpretation of the privacy practices of an extension. It emulates user interactions to trigger the extension’s functionalities and analyzes the initiators of network requests to accurately extract the users’ data transferred by the extension from the browser to external servers. Our end-to-end evaluation has shown ExtPrivA to detect inconsistencies between the privacy disclosures and data-collection behavior with an 85% precision. In a large-scale study of 47.2k extensions on the Chrome Web Store, we found 820 extensions with 1,290 flows that are inconsistent with their privacy statements. Even worse, we have found 525 pairs of contradictory privacy statements in the Dashboard disclosures and privacy policies of 360 extensions. These discrepancies between the privacy disclosures and the actual data-collection behavior are deemed as serious violations of the Store’s policies. Our findings highlight the critical issues in the privacy disclosures of browser extensions that potentially mislead, and even pose high privacy risks to, end-users.
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检测不一致的隐私实践的浏览器扩展
所有主要的web浏览器都支持扩展,以提供额外的功能,增强用户的浏览体验,而扩展可以在用户浏览网页时访问和收集用户的数据。虽然网络扩展通过多种形式的通知告知用户他们的数据实践,但之前的工作忽略了实际数据实践与浏览器扩展发布的隐私声明之间的关键差距。为了填补这一空白,我们提出了ExtPrivA,它可以自动检测浏览器扩展的数据收集和隐私披露之间的不一致。从隐私政策和仪表板披露中,ExtPrivA提取隐私声明,以便对扩展的隐私实践有一个清晰的解释。它模拟用户交互来触发扩展的功能,并分析网络请求的发起者,以准确地提取由扩展从浏览器传输到外部服务器的用户数据。我们的端到端评估表明,ExtPrivA能够以85%的精度检测隐私披露和数据收集行为之间的不一致性。在一项针对Chrome Web Store上47.2万个扩展的大规模研究中,我们发现820个扩展中有1290个流与其隐私声明不一致。更糟糕的是,我们在360扩展的仪表板披露和隐私政策中发现了525对相互矛盾的隐私声明。这些隐私披露与实际数据收集行为之间的差异被视为严重违反商店政策。我们的研究结果强调了浏览器扩展隐私披露中的关键问题,这些问题可能会误导甚至给最终用户带来很高的隐私风险。
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