Practical Wisdom: What Philosophy and Literature Can Add to Psychology

Abstract

In the course of studying the cognitive and affective components of wise judgment, psychology has largely neglected the moral dimensions of wisdom. In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle places moral will at the center of his discussion, and points out how skill divorced from will—divorced from virtue and character—can create knavish individuals who will mold institutions that corrupt human character. In this chapter, the author discusses the central role that moral will must play in a complete discussion of wisdom. Understanding moral will requires understanding the proper telos of human activities and practices, as well as the virtues of character that people need in order to remain true to the telos of those practices. Discussion of these essential topics is avoided by psychologists, but embraced by philosophers. Thus, philosophy has a central role to play in developing a proper understanding of practical wisdom. Moreover, for Aristotle, wise practice typically involves finding the “mean” between extremes. But the mean is not formulaic; it is context specific. This means that wise judgment must give priority to the particular, which, in turn, means that judgment must be understood as embedded in narrative. Thus, an understanding of narrative, best embodied by literary studies, has much to contribute to a complete understanding of wisdom. In sum, a complete account of practical wisdom requires psychology, philosophy, and literary studies acting as partners.