When Do Sensitive Survey Questions Elicit Truthful Answers? Theory and Evidence with Application to the RRT and the List Experiment

Alberto Simpser
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引用次数: 9

Abstract

Corruption, vote buying, and other sensitive topics are difficult to study because people tend to under-report them in surveys. The degree of under-reporting bias has been shown to vary across studies, contexts, and question structures, but no systematic explanation for the variation has been advanced. I provide a simple theory that describes conditions under which an individual is more - or less - likely to respond truthfully to a sensitive question. The theory is based on the intuition that respondents lie to avoid looking bad in the eyes of interviewers. The main implication is that a respondent's second-order beliefs about the interviewer's priors are a key determinant of truthfulness. Empirical analysis of original data supports this claim: respondent's second-order beliefs correlate strongly with self-reported nonvoting and cheating. I show how second-order beliefs can be used to adjust for under-reporting bias.
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什么时候敏感的调查问题能得到真实的答案?理论与证据及其在RRT和列表实验中的应用
腐败、贿选和其他敏感话题很难研究,因为人们倾向于在调查中少报。低报偏倚的程度已被证明在不同的研究、背景和问题结构中有所不同,但没有对这种差异提出系统的解释。我提供了一个简单的理论,描述了一个人或多或少可能对敏感问题做出真实反应的条件。这一理论是基于一种直觉,即受访者撒谎是为了避免在面试官眼中显得不好。主要的含义是,被调查者对面试官的先验的二阶信念是真实性的关键决定因素。对原始数据的实证分析支持这一说法:被调查者的二阶信念与自我报告的不投票和作弊密切相关。我展示了如何使用二阶信念来调整报告不足的偏见。
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