Persephone Zeri, Charalambos Tsekeris, T. Tsekeris
The present study starts from the premise that, for human communities, it is difficult to penetrate each other, so that even the globally diffused communication infrastructure is not enough to create an effective common life. This grounds our assumptions about the way the Greek young interviewees, aged between 18 and 32, belonging to main political orientations (centre right, centre left, radical left, and extreme right), are perceiving themselves and their transnational sociopolitical environment, especially Europe and the powerful foreign institutions in the era of financial crisis. We first focus on the question of collective identity, on how the sense of we-ness (the self-perception of the Greek citizens as a human group) is represented in the consciousness and attitudes of the young interviewees of different ideological orientations. A theoretical starting point pertains to the assumption that the collective identity does involve imagining or representing things; but the imaginary it involves is an instituting social imaginary in the sense of an implicit cognitive infrastructure of the Greek society, which originates in the past and shapes the image Greeks have about the world, their values, their common reality. The main research objective is to make intelligible how the young interviewees perceive the diverse facets of their collective identity, how the Greek instituting social imaginary and the imaginary significations it produces (values, ideas, habits, and so on) are expressed in their individual imaginary, what it means for them as responsible citizens, how they frame religion and the ancient Greek past, whether they feel represented by the representatives they have supported, how they perceive the powerful foreign institutions, the European Union and their relationship to the Greek society.
{"title":"The Social Power Dynamics of Post-truth Politics: How the Greek Youth Perceives the 'Powerful' Foreigners and Constructs the Image of the European Partners","authors":"Persephone Zeri, Charalambos Tsekeris, T. Tsekeris","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3483885","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3483885","url":null,"abstract":"The present study starts from the premise that, for human communities, it is difficult to penetrate each other, so that even the globally diffused communication infrastructure is not enough to create an effective common life. This grounds our assumptions about the way the Greek young interviewees, aged between 18 and 32, belonging to main political orientations (centre right, centre left, radical left, and extreme right), are perceiving themselves and their transnational sociopolitical environment, especially Europe and the powerful foreign institutions in the era of financial crisis. We first focus on the question of collective identity, on how the sense of we-ness (the self-perception of the Greek citizens as a human group) is represented in the consciousness and attitudes of the young interviewees of different ideological orientations. A theoretical starting point pertains to the assumption that the collective identity does involve imagining or representing things; but the imaginary it involves is an instituting social imaginary in the sense of an implicit cognitive infrastructure of the Greek society, which originates in the past and shapes the image Greeks have about the world, their values, their common reality. The main research objective is to make intelligible how the young interviewees perceive the diverse facets of their collective identity, how the Greek instituting social imaginary and the imaginary significations it produces (values, ideas, habits, and so on) are expressed in their individual imaginary, what it means for them as responsible citizens, how they frame religion and the ancient Greek past, whether they feel represented by the representatives they have supported, how they perceive the powerful foreign institutions, the European Union and their relationship to the Greek society.","PeriodicalId":188368,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117049794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Corruption, vote buying, and other sensitive topics are difficult to study because people tend to under-report them in surveys. The degree of under-reporting bias has been shown to vary across studies, contexts, and question structures, but no systematic explanation for the variation has been advanced. I provide a simple theory that describes conditions under which an individual is more - or less - likely to respond truthfully to a sensitive question. The theory is based on the intuition that respondents lie to avoid looking bad in the eyes of interviewers. The main implication is that a respondent's second-order beliefs about the interviewer's priors are a key determinant of truthfulness. Empirical analysis of original data supports this claim: respondent's second-order beliefs correlate strongly with self-reported nonvoting and cheating. I show how second-order beliefs can be used to adjust for under-reporting bias.
{"title":"When Do Sensitive Survey Questions Elicit Truthful Answers? Theory and Evidence with Application to the RRT and the List Experiment","authors":"Alberto Simpser","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3032684","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3032684","url":null,"abstract":"Corruption, vote buying, and other sensitive topics are difficult to study because people tend to under-report them in surveys. The degree of under-reporting bias has been shown to vary across studies, contexts, and question structures, but no systematic explanation for the variation has been advanced. I provide a simple theory that describes conditions under which an individual is more - or less - likely to respond truthfully to a sensitive question. The theory is based on the intuition that respondents lie to avoid looking bad in the eyes of interviewers. The main implication is that a respondent's second-order beliefs about the interviewer's priors are a key determinant of truthfulness. Empirical analysis of original data supports this claim: respondent's second-order beliefs correlate strongly with self-reported nonvoting and cheating. I show how second-order beliefs can be used to adjust for under-reporting bias.","PeriodicalId":188368,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116119895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gregory A. Porumbescu, N. Bellé, M. Cucciniello, G. Nasi
This study examines the impact of policy transparency on citizens’ levels of policy understanding and support for a hypothetical policy. Specifically, we propose that the effects of transparency on understanding are heavily contingent upon the way government information is presented. Further, we suggest that greater policy understanding will be associated with higher levels of policy support. We examine these relationships using a survey experiment that draws upon a nationally representative panel of citizens. The results demonstrate that effects of policy transparency on policy understanding are heavily contingent upon presentation – participants exposed to more detailed information about the policy understood the policy worse than those exposed to less detailed information. In turn, objective levels of understanding are associated with lower levels of policy support. As such, our findings suggest the presence of a positive indirect effect of policy transparency on policy support. Our study also shows that an individual’s sense of understanding predicts greater policy support among citizens with a poor objective understanding of the policy. Implications for theory and research are discussed.
{"title":"Experimental Evidence on the Impact of Policy Transparency on Policy Understanding, and Policy Support","authors":"Gregory A. Porumbescu, N. Bellé, M. Cucciniello, G. Nasi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2805558","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2805558","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the impact of policy transparency on citizens’ levels of policy understanding and support for a hypothetical policy. Specifically, we propose that the effects of transparency on understanding are heavily contingent upon the way government information is presented. Further, we suggest that greater policy understanding will be associated with higher levels of policy support. We examine these relationships using a survey experiment that draws upon a nationally representative panel of citizens. The results demonstrate that effects of policy transparency on policy understanding are heavily contingent upon presentation – participants exposed to more detailed information about the policy understood the policy worse than those exposed to less detailed information. In turn, objective levels of understanding are associated with lower levels of policy support. As such, our findings suggest the presence of a positive indirect effect of policy transparency on policy support. Our study also shows that an individual’s sense of understanding predicts greater policy support among citizens with a poor objective understanding of the policy. Implications for theory and research are discussed.","PeriodicalId":188368,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"71 1-2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123589327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is well-known that people resist proposals for change for reasons that are independent of a rational calculation of self-interest. This article explores two sources of resistance that affect public policy advocates in particular: "Resonance," (negative associations with past experience or other policy domains), and a desire t avoid the psychological and material costs of "transition," (the process of adjustment, personal and institutional, that comes with any significant change). The author argues that conventional advocacy, in which one side "names the change" and attempts to force others to go along, inherently triggers negative resonance and heightens fears of transition. If advocates can engage opposing groups in some form of negotiation or collaboration to "name the change," these sources of resistance will diminish. Finally, even where collaboration is not possible, the article suggests that advocates who are self-aware about the risks and losses that they are asking decision-makers to undergo will avoid the tendency to assume that the worst about the intentions of other participants in public disputes.
{"title":"Resistance: A Primer for Advocates and Change Agents","authors":"R. Conner","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1372214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1372214","url":null,"abstract":"It is well-known that people resist proposals for change for reasons that are independent of a rational calculation of self-interest. This article explores two sources of resistance that affect public policy advocates in particular: \"Resonance,\" (negative associations with past experience or other policy domains), and a desire t avoid the psychological and material costs of \"transition,\" (the process of adjustment, personal and institutional, that comes with any significant change). The author argues that conventional advocacy, in which one side \"names the change\" and attempts to force others to go along, inherently triggers negative resonance and heightens fears of transition. If advocates can engage opposing groups in some form of negotiation or collaboration to \"name the change,\" these sources of resistance will diminish. Finally, even where collaboration is not possible, the article suggests that advocates who are self-aware about the risks and losses that they are asking decision-makers to undergo will avoid the tendency to assume that the worst about the intentions of other participants in public disputes.","PeriodicalId":188368,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Other Political Behavior: Cognition","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116551834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}