Another Way from Davos:

Abstract

In A Parting of the Ways, Friedman narrates the Davos debate as a catalysator in the genesis of two diverging trajectories within twentieth-century philosophy. In this paper, I introduce a participant of the Davos debate, Jean Cavaillès, who does not adhere to Friedman’s bifurcation and who was able to zigzag between the developments in phenomenology and logical positivism. To show how this French epistemologist was able to connect these two traditions, I detail Cavaillès’ encounter with the Vienna Circle, explicate his Kantianism, and chronicle the place of Bolzano in his account of the (historical) development of philosophy of science. After that, I examine Cavaillès’ critique of Carnap’s Logische Syntax der Sprache and argue that Cavaillès’ theory of science is much closer to Carnap’s logical analysis than either he himself or the secondary literature suggests. Both philosophers, in fact, argue for the importance of constructing the unity of science, affirm the autonomous development of science, and conceptualize a dynamic notion of the a priori. In the conclusion, I disclose the similarities between Cavaillès’ conceptualization of the dynamic a priori and Friedman’s relativized a priori, and argue for the importance of extending Friedman’s account of the interwar developments in philosophy of science.