Pub Date : 2023-06-19DOI: 10.23925/2764-0892.2022.v2.n1.e62112
S. Gabriel
In the past, philosophy, as it was brought to life originally by the ancient Greeks, was based on the audacious premise that the cosmos is intelligible, that human reason can come to understand reality at least in part. In the early to mid-twentieth century, however, philosophy was declared dead on both sides of the analytic-continental divide, so it seems appropriate to ask whether philosophy has a future and, if so, what sort of future this could and should be. In this essay, I first look at the claims of philosophy’s demise and their philosophical milieu, focusing on Martin Heidegger, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Then I suggest a reason for the dire forecast, namely, the aftermath of what has been called the “Second Thirty Years’ War,” and respond to objections that can be raised against this explanation. Finally, I indicate the sort of future that I think we should envision for philosophy.
{"title":"The Future of Philosophy","authors":"S. Gabriel","doi":"10.23925/2764-0892.2022.v2.n1.e62112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23925/2764-0892.2022.v2.n1.e62112","url":null,"abstract":"In the past, philosophy, as it was brought to life originally by the ancient Greeks, was based on the audacious premise that the cosmos is intelligible, that human reason can come to understand reality at least in part. In the early to mid-twentieth century, however, philosophy was declared dead on both sides of the analytic-continental divide, so it seems appropriate to ask whether philosophy has a future and, if so, what sort of future this could and should be. In this essay, I first look at the claims of philosophy’s demise and their philosophical milieu, focusing on Martin Heidegger, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Then I suggest a reason for the dire forecast, namely, the aftermath of what has been called the “Second Thirty Years’ War,” and respond to objections that can be raised against this explanation. Finally, I indicate the sort of future that I think we should envision for philosophy.","PeriodicalId":105071,"journal":{"name":"Geltung - Revista de Estudos das Origens da Filosofia Contemporânea","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115332970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-02DOI: 10.23925/2764-0892.2022.v2.n1.e60382
L. Vollet
It is a consensus to locate the origin of the reflexive foundations of modern semantics in Frege's work. Since Frege's distinction between two components of meaning (sense and reference), however, semantics has been forced to lead a double life. Among its first receptions, in Russell's famous article (1905), the first unresolved criticism of this solution was that: It is not possible to split semantics into a theory about two classes of objects without their yielding one and the same thing under lower and higher conditions of instantiation (depending on the function used to identify it). But even Russell could not avoid a crisis. It is not possible to reconcile semantic coordination for a set of non-classical extension of instantiation and encoding (possible instances, counterfactual truth values, etc.) while preserving the classical properties of signification. This article covers these moments with a rough diagnosis: modern semantics has a reflexive ceiling. It is unable to model the contingent features of an "object" without oversizing itself to deal with various constraints on that object adapted to various strategies of intensional and modal specification. In order to model idealized conditions of assertability (Putnam), one must filter the sentences that pass Tarskian test using non-sematic parameters – like the parameter of coherence of a scientific paradigm. It cannot keep that model without stopping being semantic. We conclude with a response to attempts to give semantic status to complex scientific reasoning, and a suggestion as to how to locate the philosophical origin of this claim.
{"title":"The reflexive ceiling of philosophical semantics:","authors":"L. Vollet","doi":"10.23925/2764-0892.2022.v2.n1.e60382","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23925/2764-0892.2022.v2.n1.e60382","url":null,"abstract":"It is a consensus to locate the origin of the reflexive foundations of modern semantics in Frege's work. Since Frege's distinction between two components of meaning (sense and reference), however, semantics has been forced to lead a double life. Among its first receptions, in Russell's famous article (1905), the first unresolved criticism of this solution was that: It is not possible to split semantics into a theory about two classes of objects without their yielding one and the same thing under lower and higher conditions of instantiation (depending on the function used to identify it). But even Russell could not avoid a crisis. It is not possible to reconcile semantic coordination for a set of non-classical extension of instantiation and encoding (possible instances, counterfactual truth values, etc.) while preserving the classical properties of signification. This article covers these moments with a rough diagnosis: modern semantics has a reflexive ceiling. It is unable to model the contingent features of an \"object\" without oversizing itself to deal with various constraints on that object adapted to various strategies of intensional and modal specification. In order to model idealized conditions of assertability (Putnam), one must filter the sentences that pass Tarskian test using non-sematic parameters – like the parameter of coherence of a scientific paradigm. It cannot keep that model without stopping being semantic. We conclude with a response to attempts to give semantic status to complex scientific reasoning, and a suggestion as to how to locate the philosophical origin of this claim.","PeriodicalId":105071,"journal":{"name":"Geltung - Revista de Estudos das Origens da Filosofia Contemporânea","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130485434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-27DOI: 10.23925/1764-0892.2021.v1.n2.e61293
Chiara Russo Krauss
Friedrich Albert Lange was a neo-Kantian and a socialist. Scholars have questioned whether there is a connection between these two aspects of Lange’s work. The paper argues that such a connection is apparent once Lange’s philosophy is understood in light of Schiller’s Kantianism. According to Lange, Schiller’s aesthetic redemption consists of two tasks: to create the beautiful image of an ideal reality; and to realize this ideal model in the actual world. Accordingly, I show that Lange’s political analysis points to three different types of social evolution: 1) one corresponding to the natural state of humanity, based on Darwin’s and Malthus’s concept of the struggle for survival; 2) one corresponding to ideal evolution, in which all human beings achieve full development of their talents (first task of the esthetic redemption); 3) one corresponding to the actual realization of this ideal, in which human beings advance step by step thanks to social experimentation and the resulting progress in knowledge (second task of esthetic redemption).
{"title":"struggle for Existence and the Ideal","authors":"Chiara Russo Krauss","doi":"10.23925/1764-0892.2021.v1.n2.e61293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23925/1764-0892.2021.v1.n2.e61293","url":null,"abstract":"Friedrich Albert Lange was a neo-Kantian and a socialist. Scholars have questioned whether there is a connection between these two aspects of Lange’s work. The paper argues that such a connection is apparent once Lange’s philosophy is understood in light of Schiller’s Kantianism. According to Lange, Schiller’s aesthetic redemption consists of two tasks: to create the beautiful image of an ideal reality; and to realize this ideal model in the actual world. Accordingly, I show that Lange’s political analysis points to three different types of social evolution: 1) one corresponding to the natural state of humanity, based on Darwin’s and Malthus’s concept of the struggle for survival; 2) one corresponding to ideal evolution, in which all human beings achieve full development of their talents (first task of the esthetic redemption); 3) one corresponding to the actual realization of this ideal, in which human beings advance step by step thanks to social experimentation and the resulting progress in knowledge (second task of esthetic redemption).","PeriodicalId":105071,"journal":{"name":"Geltung - Revista de Estudos das Origens da Filosofia Contemporânea","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122584096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-10DOI: 10.23925/1764-0892.2021.v1.n2.e60697
Bruno Bueno Poli
The purpose of the review is to provide a descriptive analysis of Gottfried Gabriel's book, focusing on the main doctrines of Kant
回顾的目的是提供一个描述性的分析戈特弗里德加布里埃尔的书，集中在康德的主要学说
{"title":"Review - GABRIEL, Gottfried. Kant: Eine kurze Einführung in das Gesamtwerk. Paderborn: Brill Schöningh, 2022. 144 p.","authors":"Bruno Bueno Poli","doi":"10.23925/1764-0892.2021.v1.n2.e60697","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23925/1764-0892.2021.v1.n2.e60697","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of the review is to provide a descriptive analysis of Gottfried Gabriel's book, focusing on the main doctrines of Kant","PeriodicalId":105071,"journal":{"name":"Geltung - Revista de Estudos das Origens da Filosofia Contemporânea","volume":"120 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115758282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-10DOI: 10.23925/1764-0892.2021.v1.n2.e61177
J. Bonifaci
{"title":"Review - RICKERT, Heinrich: Los Dos Caminos De La Teoría Del Conocimiento Y Otros Ensayos. Edición De Stefano Cazzanelli Y Miguel Martí Sánchez. Editorial Comares: Granada, 2022.","authors":"J. Bonifaci","doi":"10.23925/1764-0892.2021.v1.n2.e61177","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23925/1764-0892.2021.v1.n2.e61177","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":105071,"journal":{"name":"Geltung - Revista de Estudos das Origens da Filosofia Contemporânea","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129627467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-13DOI: 10.23925/2764-0892.2021.v1.n2.e57747
L. Vollet
This short paper focuses on Kripke's paper on truth from 1975. It is 1. a historiographical commentary, 2. an argument about the advantages of the theory, and 3. an interpretation of its philosophical meaning. 1. Kripke presents a diagnosis of semantic paradoxes based on their similarity with ungrounded sentences. Based on Kleene's three-value logic, he then shows that it is possible to find fixed points in which the assertion of an unsubstantiated (non-paradoxical) sentence can sustain a cumulative distance with its anti-extension. 2. We argue that Kripke's paper has the advantage of explaining risk in truth assessments. It provides a framework to solve problems of languages that have their truth predicate. Although compatible with Tarski's, this solution more faithfully paints the speculative and revisionist representation of assignments of truth. It exhibits the conditions of stable risk assertions (whose fixed point accumulates semantic value in a single direction) and distinguishes it from irrational assertions, which, as dogmas, base their risk on arbitrary points and provide an unstable basis for truth assertions.
{"title":"Dogma, Assertive grounds and forms of Truth-assignment failure","authors":"L. Vollet","doi":"10.23925/2764-0892.2021.v1.n2.e57747","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23925/2764-0892.2021.v1.n2.e57747","url":null,"abstract":"This short paper focuses on Kripke's paper on truth from 1975. It is 1. a historiographical commentary, 2. an argument about the advantages of the theory, and 3. an interpretation of its philosophical meaning. 1. Kripke presents a diagnosis of semantic paradoxes based on their similarity with ungrounded sentences. Based on Kleene's three-value logic, he then shows that it is possible to find fixed points in which the assertion of an unsubstantiated (non-paradoxical) sentence can sustain a cumulative distance with its anti-extension. 2. We argue that Kripke's paper has the advantage of explaining risk in truth assessments. It provides a framework to solve problems of languages that have their truth predicate. Although compatible with Tarski's, this solution more faithfully paints the speculative and revisionist representation of assignments of truth. It exhibits the conditions of stable risk assertions (whose fixed point accumulates semantic value in a single direction) and distinguishes it from irrational assertions, which, as dogmas, base their risk on arbitrary points and provide an unstable basis for truth assertions. \u0000 ","PeriodicalId":105071,"journal":{"name":"Geltung - Revista de Estudos das Origens da Filosofia Contemporânea","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117160778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-13DOI: 10.23925/2764-0892.2021.v1.n2.e57081
Ties Van Gemert
In A Parting of the Ways, Friedman narrates the Davos debate as a catalysator in the genesis of two diverging trajectories within twentieth-century philosophy. In this paper, I introduce a participant of the Davos debate, Jean Cavaillès, who does not adhere to Friedman’s bifurcation and who was able to zigzag between the developments in phenomenology and logical positivism. To show how this French epistemologist was able to connect these two traditions, I detail Cavaillès’ encounter with the Vienna Circle, explicate his Kantianism, and chronicle the place of Bolzano in his account of the (historical) development of philosophy of science. After that, I examine Cavaillès’ critique of Carnap’s Logische Syntax der Sprache and argue that Cavaillès’ theory of science is much closer to Carnap’s logical analysis than either he himself or the secondary literature suggests. Both philosophers, in fact, argue for the importance of constructing the unity of science, affirm the autonomous development of science, and conceptualize a dynamic notion of the a priori. In the conclusion, I disclose the similarities between Cavaillès’ conceptualization of the dynamic a priori and Friedman’s relativized a priori, and argue for the importance of extending Friedman’s account of the interwar developments in philosophy of science.
{"title":"Another Way from Davos:","authors":"Ties Van Gemert","doi":"10.23925/2764-0892.2021.v1.n2.e57081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23925/2764-0892.2021.v1.n2.e57081","url":null,"abstract":"In A Parting of the Ways, Friedman narrates the Davos debate as a catalysator in the genesis of two diverging trajectories within twentieth-century philosophy. In this paper, I introduce a participant of the Davos debate, Jean Cavaillès, who does not adhere to Friedman’s bifurcation and who was able to zigzag between the developments in phenomenology and logical positivism. To show how this French epistemologist was able to connect these two traditions, I detail Cavaillès’ encounter with the Vienna Circle, explicate his Kantianism, and chronicle the place of Bolzano in his account of the (historical) development of philosophy of science. After that, I examine Cavaillès’ critique of Carnap’s Logische Syntax der Sprache and argue that Cavaillès’ theory of science is much closer to Carnap’s logical analysis than either he himself or the secondary literature suggests. Both philosophers, in fact, argue for the importance of constructing the unity of science, affirm the autonomous development of science, and conceptualize a dynamic notion of the a priori. In the conclusion, I disclose the similarities between Cavaillès’ conceptualization of the dynamic a priori and Friedman’s relativized a priori, and argue for the importance of extending Friedman’s account of the interwar developments in philosophy of science.","PeriodicalId":105071,"journal":{"name":"Geltung - Revista de Estudos das Origens da Filosofia Contemporânea","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116308445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-25DOI: 10.23925/2764-0892.2021.v1.n1.e55986
Gottfried Gabriel
For a long time controversies between analytic and continental philosophy have dominated the discussion. However, the distinction itself is already problematic in two different aspects. First, both characterizations are, in comparison, somehow asymmetrical, since “analytic” is a methodological determination, whereas continental is a “geographical” one. Second, the geographic classification in question, according to which analytic philosophers should be assigned to the Anglo-Saxon region, does not obtain. Analytic philosophers such as Frege, Wittgenstein and Carnap not only came from the continent, but also experienced their essential intellectual influences there (Frege and Carnap in Jena, Wittgenstein in Vienna). In the following I would like to demonstrate my assertion by taking Frege and Carnap as examples and showing their continental roots.
{"title":"Continental Roots of Analytic Philosophy - Carnap and Frege as Examples","authors":"Gottfried Gabriel","doi":"10.23925/2764-0892.2021.v1.n1.e55986","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23925/2764-0892.2021.v1.n1.e55986","url":null,"abstract":"For a long time controversies between analytic and continental philosophy have dominated the discussion. However, the distinction itself is already problematic in two different aspects. First, both characterizations are, in comparison, somehow asymmetrical, since “analytic” is a methodological determination, whereas continental is a “geographical” one. Second, the geographic classification in question, according to which analytic philosophers should be assigned to the Anglo-Saxon region, does not obtain. Analytic philosophers such as Frege, Wittgenstein and Carnap not only came from the continent, but also experienced their essential intellectual influences there (Frege and Carnap in Jena, Wittgenstein in Vienna). In the following I would like to demonstrate my assertion by taking Frege and Carnap as examples and showing their continental roots.","PeriodicalId":105071,"journal":{"name":"Geltung - Revista de Estudos das Origens da Filosofia Contemporânea","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122574415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-25DOI: 10.23925/2764-0892.2021.v1.n1.e55649
Mario A. G. Porta
Frege’s decisive and well-known critique of psychologism does not exclude, but rather presupposes, a certain peculiar conception of subjectivity.
弗雷格对心理主义的决定性和著名的批判并不排除，而是预设了某种特殊的主体性概念。
{"title":"Frege’s philosophy of mind? The conception of subjectivity in Frege","authors":"Mario A. G. Porta","doi":"10.23925/2764-0892.2021.v1.n1.e55649","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23925/2764-0892.2021.v1.n1.e55649","url":null,"abstract":"Frege’s decisive and well-known critique of psychologism does not exclude, but rather presupposes, a certain peculiar conception of subjectivity.","PeriodicalId":105071,"journal":{"name":"Geltung - Revista de Estudos das Origens da Filosofia Contemporânea","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128951558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-25DOI: 10.23925/2764-0892.2021.v1.n1.e55724
T. Uebel
This paper warns against misunderstanding the logical empiricists’ take on the concepts of experience and empiricism. Far from expressing traditionalist way-of-ideas conceptions, these concepts were themselves rethought and refashioned to accord with their overall aim of making contemporary philosophy of science fit for purpose. To this end, this paper disarms the supposed counter-examples of Schlick’s foundationalism and Carnap’s Aufbau and exemplifies the aimed for understanding by examples of the physialist theorising of Carnap and Neurath.
{"title":"On the Empiricism of Logical Empiricism","authors":"T. Uebel","doi":"10.23925/2764-0892.2021.v1.n1.e55724","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.23925/2764-0892.2021.v1.n1.e55724","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 \u0000This paper warns against misunderstanding the logical empiricists’ take on the concepts of experience and empiricism. Far from expressing traditionalist way-of-ideas conceptions, these concepts were themselves rethought and refashioned to accord with their overall aim of making contemporary philosophy of science fit for purpose. To this end, this paper disarms the supposed counter-examples of Schlick’s foundationalism and Carnap’s Aufbau and exemplifies the aimed for understanding by examples of the physialist theorising of Carnap and Neurath. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000","PeriodicalId":105071,"journal":{"name":"Geltung - Revista de Estudos das Origens da Filosofia Contemporânea","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125964200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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