Modest Property Rights for the Right-Holder’s Sake

Rowan Cruft
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Abstract

Chapter 12 assesses arguments that certain specific property rights, and some general rights to participate in property systems, can be morally justifiable for the right-holder’s own sake—primarily on the basis of the right-holder’s own good—in a way that makes them ‘natural’ or recognition-independent rights. Versions of such arguments based on the importance of the right-holder’s freedom, her chosen purposes, and her other human rights, are developed from the work of Hegel, Locke, and Nickel, respectively. The chapter shows that the reach of these arguments is limited. Some property rights might indeed be ‘natural’ rights groundable for the right-holder’s sake, but the chapter’s arguments imply that most property held by those who are moderately wealthy cannot be—including any property rights morally justifiable only as the results of a market exchange.
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为权利人着想的适度产权
第12章评估了一些观点,即某些特定的财产权,以及参与财产制度的一些一般权利,出于权利持有人自身利益的考虑(主要基于权利持有人自身利益),在道德上是正当的,从而使它们成为“自然的”或独立于承认的权利。基于权利持有者的自由、其选择的目的和其他人权的重要性,这些论点的不同版本分别从黑格尔、洛克和尼克尔的著作中发展而来。本章表明,这些论点的范围是有限的。有些财产权可能确实是“自然的”权利,出于权利持有人的利益,但本章的论点暗示,那些中等富裕的人所拥有的大多数财产不能——包括任何只有作为市场交换的结果才在道德上合理的财产权。
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