On the Political Economy of Regulation

J. Laffont, David Motlow
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Summary: During the past decade, theoreticians have laid the foundations for optimal normative regulation. Taking as an example the pricing of a communication channel, this article demonstrates the need to go further and choose the lesser of two evils: economic inefficiency or political arbitrariness. The sophisticated pricing methods envisaged by the theory do in fact give politicians considerable latitude to distort tariffs in their own interests or those of the group backing them. Exactly the same type of choice has to be made in laying down constitutional rules governing regulation and privatization.
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论规制的政治经济学
摘要:在过去的十年里,理论家们为最优规范监管奠定了基础。本文以通信渠道的定价为例,说明需要更进一步,选择两害相权取其轻:经济效率低下或政治随意性。该理论设想的复杂定价方法,实际上确实给了政客们相当大的自由,可以为了自己或支持关税的集团的利益扭曲关税。在制定管理管制和私有化的宪法规则时,必须作出完全相同的选择。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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