Social Status and Prosocial Behavior

Abstract

This paper studies the effects of social status - a socially recognized ranking of individuals - on prosocial behavior. We use a laboratory experiment and propose a theory to address this issue. In a one-shot game, two players, whose social status is either earned or randomly assigned, jointly make effort contributions to a project. Player 1 first suggests their effort levels to player 2 who then determines the actual effort for each player. Deviation from the suggestion is costly. We find causal evidence that high-status players are less selfish than their low-status counterparts. In particular, high-status players 2 are less selfish and deviate less from the suggestion when status is earned than when it is randomly assigned. Moreover, players 1 with high status offer more generous effort provision plans. The experimental results and theoretical framework allow us to conclude that a high social ranking yields more social behavior and that this can be attributed to the sense of responsibility that it gives.