This paper studies the effects of social status - a socially recognized ranking of individuals - on prosocial behavior. We use a laboratory experiment and propose a theory to address this issue. In a one-shot game, two players, whose social status is either earned or randomly assigned, jointly make effort contributions to a project. Player 1 first suggests their effort levels to player 2 who then determines the actual effort for each player. Deviation from the suggestion is costly. We find causal evidence that high-status players are less selfish than their low-status counterparts. In particular, high-status players 2 are less selfish and deviate less from the suggestion when status is earned than when it is randomly assigned. Moreover, players 1 with high status offer more generous effort provision plans. The experimental results and theoretical framework allow us to conclude that a high social ranking yields more social behavior and that this can be attributed to the sense of responsibility that it gives.
{"title":"Social Status and Prosocial Behavior","authors":"Jin Di Zheng, Arthur Schram, Tianle Song","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3889113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3889113","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the effects of social status - a socially recognized ranking of individuals - on prosocial behavior. We use a laboratory experiment and propose a theory to address this issue. In a one-shot game, two players, whose social status is either earned or randomly assigned, jointly make effort contributions to a project. Player 1 first suggests their effort levels to player 2 who then determines the actual effort for each player. Deviation from the suggestion is costly. We find causal evidence that high-status players are less selfish than their low-status counterparts. In particular, high-status players 2 are less selfish and deviate less from the suggestion when status is earned than when it is randomly assigned. Moreover, players 1 with high status offer more generous effort provision plans. The experimental results and theoretical framework allow us to conclude that a high social ranking yields more social behavior and that this can be attributed to the sense of responsibility that it gives.","PeriodicalId":447936,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)","volume":"150 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116629403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we study intertemporal social welfare evaluations when agents have heterogeneous preferences that are interpersonally noncomparable. We first show that even if all agents share the same preferences, there is a conflict between the axioms of Pareto principle, time consistency, and equity requiring society to reduce inequality regardless of the past. We argue that responsibility for past choices should be taken into account and, thus, the equity axiom is not compelling. Then we introduce another form of equity that takes the past into consideration and is compatible with time consistency. Using this form of equity and time consistency, we characterize maximin and leximin social welfare criteria that are history‐dependent.
{"title":"Time Consistent Fair Social Choice","authors":"Kaname Miyagishima","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3862288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3862288","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we study intertemporal social welfare evaluations when agents have heterogeneous preferences that are interpersonally noncomparable. We first show that even if all agents share the same preferences, there is a conflict between the axioms of Pareto principle, time consistency, and equity requiring society to reduce inequality regardless of the past. We argue that responsibility for past choices should be taken into account and, thus, the equity axiom is not compelling. Then we introduce another form of equity that takes the past into consideration and is compatible with time consistency. Using this form of equity and time consistency, we characterize maximin and leximin social welfare criteria that are history‐dependent.","PeriodicalId":447936,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)","volume":"24 12","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113979716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the transmission of messages in social networks in the presence of biased and unbiased agents. Biased agents prefer a specific outcome while unbiased agents prefer the true state of the world. Each agent who receives a message knows the identity (but not the type) of the person from whom the message originates and only the identity and types of their immediate neighbors. After learning the true state of the world, depending on their type, the root agent creates and transmit a message about the state to her neighbors who may then decide to transmit it forward depending on their type. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game, and show that the social network acts as a filter: distance between the source and the other agents who form posteriors beliefs about the true state based on the message received now depends on the distance a message travels. Thus, unbiased agents, who receive a message from a biased agent, are more likely to transmit it further by assigning higher credibility to it when they are further away from the source. For a given network, we compute the probability that it will always support the transmission of messages by biased agents. We establish that star networks maximize the probability that messages will be transmitted. Finally, we establish that under some parameters, this probability increases when agents have uncertainty about their location in the network.
{"title":"False Information from Near and Far","authors":"C. Bravard, J. Durieu, S. Sarangi, S. Sémirat","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3853916","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3853916","url":null,"abstract":"We study the transmission of messages in social networks in the presence of biased and unbiased<br>agents. Biased agents prefer a specific outcome while unbiased agents prefer the true state of the world. Each agent who receives a message knows the identity (but not the type) of the person from whom the message originates and only the identity and types of their immediate neighbors. After learning the true state of the world, depending on their type, the root agent creates and transmit a message about the state to her neighbors who may then decide to transmit it forward depending on their type. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game, and show that the social network acts as a filter: distance between the source and the other agents who form posteriors beliefs about the true state based on the message received now depends on the distance a message travels. Thus, unbiased agents, who receive a message from a biased agent, are more likely to transmit it further by assigning higher credibility to it when they are further away from the source. For a given network, we compute the probability that it will always support the transmission of messages by biased agents. We establish that star networks maximize the probability that messages will be transmitted. Finally, we establish that under some parameters, this probability increases when agents have uncertainty about their location in the network.","PeriodicalId":447936,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)","volume":"131 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127007117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Giving has been shown by many studies to be a social phenomenon. However, while people may desire to conform to the donation of others, it is unclear how fundraisers should take advantage of this. In this paper we conduct a field experiment in a workplace, in which employees are sent prominent messages from a colleague who is already a donor. We find that signups for workplace giving more than double when a picture of the existing donor is displayed, relative to a message without a picture.
{"title":"Worth 1000 Words: The Effect of Social Cues on a Fundraising Campaign in a Government Agency. A","authors":"M. Sanders, D. Reinstein, Alex Tupper","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3728290","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3728290","url":null,"abstract":"Giving has been shown by many studies to be a social phenomenon. However, while people may desire to conform to the donation of others, it is unclear how fundraisers should take advantage of this. In this paper we conduct a field experiment in a workplace, in which employees are sent prominent messages from a colleague who is already a donor. We find that signups for workplace giving more than double when a picture of the existing donor is displayed, relative to a message without a picture. <br>","PeriodicalId":447936,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128708078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many scarce public resources are allocated below market-clearing prices (and sometimes for free). Such ``non-market'' mechanisms necessarily sacrifice some surplus, yet they can potentially improve equity by increasing the rents enjoyed by agents with low willingness to pay. In this paper, we develop a model of mechanism design with redistributive concerns. Agents are characterized by a privately observed willingness to pay for quality, and a publicly observed label. A market designer controls allocation and pricing of a set of objects of heterogeneous quality, and maximizes a linear combination of revenue and total surplus---with Pareto weights that depend both on observed and unobserved agent characteristics. We derive structural insights about the form of the optimal mechanism and describe how social preferences influence the use of non-market mechanisms.
{"title":"Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms","authors":"M. Akbarpour, Piotr Dworczak, S. Kominers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3609182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3609182","url":null,"abstract":"Many scarce public resources are allocated below market-clearing prices (and sometimes for free). Such ``non-market'' mechanisms necessarily sacrifice some surplus, yet they can potentially improve equity by increasing the rents enjoyed by agents with low willingness to pay. In this paper, we develop a model of mechanism design with redistributive concerns. Agents are characterized by a privately observed willingness to pay for quality, and a publicly observed label. A market designer controls allocation and pricing of a set of objects of heterogeneous quality, and maximizes a linear combination of revenue and total surplus---with Pareto weights that depend both on observed and unobserved agent characteristics. We derive structural insights about the form of the optimal mechanism and describe how social preferences influence the use of non-market mechanisms.","PeriodicalId":447936,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115764157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Informal social sanctions such as ostracism are most communities’ primary means of controlling deviance, with formal legal sanctions a costlier backup mechanism, but outside university laboratories, studies of ostracism barely exist. We construct a formal model and examine legal cases brought by targets of Japanese village ostracism. Villagers truly offending against social welfare do not bring these suits. Rather, much ostracism is opportunistic — to extort property, hide communitywide malfeasance, or harass rivals. Typically, the objective is not to employ government’s coercive power, but to have the court publicly certify that the target of ostracism is not really culpable.
{"title":"Ostracism in Japan","authors":"J. Ramseyer, E. Rasmusen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3706315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3706315","url":null,"abstract":"Informal social sanctions such as ostracism are most communities’ primary means of controlling deviance, with formal legal sanctions a costlier backup mechanism, but outside university laboratories, studies of ostracism barely exist. We construct a formal model and examine legal cases brought by targets of Japanese village ostracism. Villagers truly offending against social welfare do not bring these suits. Rather, much ostracism is opportunistic — to extort property, hide communitywide malfeasance, or harass rivals. Typically, the objective is not to employ government’s coercive power, but to have the court publicly certify that the target of ostracism is not really culpable.","PeriodicalId":447936,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132045038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Defining rules politically poses the general question of which aspects of social ordering are tractable to public institutional resolution. But not all institutions emerge from the same processes of spontaneous ordering; self-interest subject to market discipline looks very different than self-interest subject to political discipline. Because of the structural way in which changes to political rules result in distributional consequences compared to the political status quo, their emergence is fundamentally governed by the dynamics of political self-interest. In contrast, while the public definition of economic institutions is also governed by political self-interest, economic dynamics can redefine this political self-interest in socially beneficial ways. Through the analysis of the emergence of the Australian ballot and the general corporate form in the 19th Century US, I argue that public economic institutional change is a process more tractable to constructivist influence. This is because dynamic economic forces (which operate through mutually beneficial exchange) can disrupt political economic equilibria. In contrast, constructivist political change is necessarily competitive, which makes such change less intrinsically related to longer-term emergent benefits to social ordering.
{"title":"Piercing the Veil of Political Altruism, or, Why Political Rules Are Weird","authors":"E. Alston","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3702733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3702733","url":null,"abstract":"Defining rules politically poses the general question of which aspects of social ordering are tractable to public institutional resolution. But not all institutions emerge from the same processes of spontaneous ordering; self-interest subject to market discipline looks very different than self-interest subject to political discipline. Because of the structural way in which changes to political rules result in distributional consequences compared to the political status quo, their emergence is fundamentally governed by the dynamics of political self-interest. In contrast, while the public definition of economic institutions is also governed by political self-interest, economic dynamics can redefine this political self-interest in socially beneficial ways. Through the analysis of the emergence of the Australian ballot and the general corporate form in the 19th Century US, I argue that public economic institutional change is a process more tractable to constructivist influence. This is because dynamic economic forces (which operate through mutually beneficial exchange) can disrupt political economic equilibria. In contrast, constructivist political change is necessarily competitive, which makes such change less intrinsically related to longer-term emergent benefits to social ordering.","PeriodicalId":447936,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)","volume":"163 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129304134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
L. Nascimento, F. Steinbruch, D. Oliveira, J. Costa, Fernando Bins Luce
Due to the relevance of social enterprises on social value creation, the marketing field is increasing its attention to these organizations. However, there seems to be no consensus in the literature on how strategic marketing can improve the performance of social enterprises. Face this, we propose the decomposition of strategic marketing into three approaches: commercial, social, and societal, which constitutes a theoretical contribution to the marketing field. Then, we develop a conceptual model that demonstrates how these strategic marketing approaches relate to the compensatory or trans-formative approaches of social entrepreneurship to improve social enterprise performance. Specifically, we argue that social enterprises can have three types of performance: commercial, social, and societal, and each one can be maximized by its corresponding strategic marketing approach. Such relations can leverage social impact, which we conceptualize as compensatory or trans-formative. Regarding practical implications, the model contributes to the possible improvement of strategic marketing decision by marketers and entrepreneurs in social entrepreneurship.
{"title":"Breaking Down the Strategic Marketing: Three Approaches for Compensatory or Transformative Social Enterprises","authors":"L. Nascimento, F. Steinbruch, D. Oliveira, J. Costa, Fernando Bins Luce","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3685189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3685189","url":null,"abstract":"Due to the relevance of social enterprises on social value creation, the marketing field is increasing its attention to these organizations. However, there seems to be no consensus in the literature on how strategic marketing can improve the performance of social enterprises. Face this, we propose the decomposition of strategic marketing into three approaches: commercial, social, and societal, which constitutes a theoretical contribution to the marketing field. Then, we develop a conceptual model that demonstrates how these strategic marketing approaches relate to the compensatory or trans-formative approaches of social entrepreneurship to improve social enterprise performance. Specifically, we argue that social enterprises can have three types of performance: commercial, social, and societal, and each one can be maximized by its corresponding strategic marketing approach. Such relations can leverage social impact, which we conceptualize as compensatory or trans-formative. Regarding practical implications, the model contributes to the possible improvement of strategic marketing decision by marketers and entrepreneurs in social entrepreneurship.","PeriodicalId":447936,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130824907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we deal with situations of collective contests between two groups over a private prize. A well known way to divide the prize within the winning group is the prize sharing rule introduced by Nitzan, 1991. Since its introduction it has become a standard in the collective contests literature. We generalize this rule by introducing a restriction we call norms of competitiveness of a group. We fully characterize how group sizes interact with such norms. What we show is that the smaller group is generally aggressive, but the larger group needs to have really egalitarian norms to behave aggressively in the contest. We also take up the question of how group welfare relates to group sizes under the stated norms. We provide a complete set of conditions under which the larger group fares worse in the contest, a phenomenon called Group Size Paradox (GSP) in the literature.
{"title":"Prize Sharing Rules in Collective Contests: When Does Group Size Matter?","authors":"D. Gupta","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3657330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3657330","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we deal with situations of collective contests between two groups over a private prize. A well known way to divide the prize within the winning group is the prize sharing rule introduced by Nitzan, 1991. Since its introduction it has become a standard in the collective contests literature. We generalize this rule by introducing a restriction we call norms of competitiveness of a group. We fully characterize how group sizes interact with such norms. What we show is that the smaller group is generally aggressive, but the larger group needs to have really egalitarian norms to behave aggressively in the contest. We also take up the question of how group welfare relates to group sizes under the stated norms. We provide a complete set of conditions under which the larger group fares worse in the contest, a phenomenon called Group Size Paradox (GSP) in the literature.","PeriodicalId":447936,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)","volume":"158 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123333794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The bankruptcy problem is to divide a homogeneous divisible good (the “estate”) between claimants, when the sum of the claims exceeds the value of the estate. When the problem is looked at from an ex-ante point of view (i.e. before the size of the estate is revealed), it is possible to formulate a notion of Pareto efficiency that is stronger than when the more common ex-post perspective is taken. Under the assumption of common beliefs, the strong notion of efficiency leads, in combination with the requirement that all claims should be fulfilled when the value of the estate is equal to the sum of the claims, to a uniquely defined division rule when utility functions for all agents are given. The resulting rule can be represented in the form of a parametric function. For the case in which all agents are equipped with the same utility function, the class of parametric functions that can be obtained in this way is characterized. In particular, it is shown that two well-known division rules for the bankruptcy problem, namely Constrained Equal Losses and Proportional Division, can be rationalized under strong Pareto efficiency by constant absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk aversion respectively.
{"title":"Ex-Ante Estate Division under Strong Pareto Efficiency","authors":"J. Schumacher","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3168679","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3168679","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The bankruptcy problem is to divide a homogeneous divisible good (the “estate”) between claimants, when the sum of the claims exceeds the value of the estate. When the problem is looked at from an ex-ante point of view (i.e. before the size of the estate is revealed), it is possible to formulate a notion of Pareto efficiency that is stronger than when the more common ex-post perspective is taken. Under the assumption of common beliefs, the strong notion of efficiency leads, in combination with the requirement that all claims should be fulfilled when the value of the estate is equal to the sum of the claims, to a uniquely defined division rule when utility functions for all agents are given. The resulting rule can be represented in the form of a parametric function. For the case in which all agents are equipped with the same utility function, the class of parametric functions that can be obtained in this way is characterized. In particular, it is shown that two well-known division rules for the bankruptcy problem, namely Constrained Equal Losses and Proportional Division, can be rationalized under strong Pareto efficiency by constant absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk aversion respectively.","PeriodicalId":447936,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Social Choice & Welfare (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123228193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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