When Less is More: Experimental Evidence on Information Delivery During India&Apos;S Demonetization

A. Banerjee, Emily Breza, Arun G. Chandrasekhar, B. Golub
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引用次数: 53

Abstract

In disseminating information, policymakers face a choice between broadcasting to everyone and informing a small number of “seeds” who then spread the message. While broadcasting maximizes the initial reach of messages, we offer theoretical and experimental evidence that it need not be the best strategy. In a field experiment during the 2016 Indian demonetization, we delivered policy information, varying three dimensions of the delivery method at the village level: initial reach (broadcasting versus seeding); whether or not we induced common knowledge of who was initially informed; and number of facts delivered. We measured three outcomes: the volume of conversations about demonetization, knowledge of demonetization rules, and choice quality in a strongly incentivized policy-dependent decision. On all three outcomes, under common knowledge, seeding dominates broadcasting; moreover, adding common knowledge makes seeding more effective but broadcasting less so. We interpret our results via a model of image concerns deterring engagement in social learning, and support this interpretation with evidence on differential behavior across ability categories.
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当少即是多:印度废钞运动期间信息传递的实验证据
在传播信息时,政策制定者面临着一个选择:是向所有人传播信息,还是通知少数“种子”,然后由他们传播信息。虽然广播最大化了信息的初始覆盖范围,但我们提供的理论和实验证据表明,它不一定是最好的策略。在2016年印度废钞运动期间的一项实地试验中,我们传递了政策信息,在村庄层面上改变了传递方法的三个维度:初始覆盖(广播与播种);我们是否诱导了谁最初被告知的常识;以及传递的事实数量。我们测量了三个结果:关于废除纸币的对话量,废除纸币规则的知识,以及在强烈激励的政策依赖决策中的选择质量。在所有三种结果中,在常识下,播种机主导广播;此外,常识的加入使播种更有效,而广播则不那么有效。我们通过一个形象顾虑阻碍社会学习参与的模型来解释我们的结果,并用不同能力类别的差异行为的证据来支持这一解释。
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