Towards cyber-resilient telecontrol commands using software-defined networking

Proceedings of the 9th Workshop on Modeling and Simulation of Cyber-Physical Energy Systems Pub Date : 2021-05-19 DOI:10.1145/3470481.3472707

Anthony Kemmeugne, A. Jahromi, D. Kundur, Marthe Kassouf

{"title":"Towards cyber-resilient telecontrol commands using software-defined networking","authors":"Anthony Kemmeugne, A. Jahromi, D. Kundur, Marthe Kassouf","doi":"10.1145/3470481.3472707","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Cybersecurity enhancement of power systems has become one of the main objectives of utility managers and regulatory agencies because of the increasing number of cyberattacks against critical infrastructures. In this paper, we investigate the application of software-defined networking for improving the cyber-resilience of power systems in the presence of cyberattacks using false telecontrol commands. It is first demonstrated that cyberattackers can use false telecontrol commands to separate a power plant from a power grid or trip a major transmission line. Next, it is shown that software-defined networking can significantly enhance the cyber-resilience of power systems in the presence of cyberattacks using false telecontrol commands compared to legacy communication networks. This is because the source, destination and protocol of telecontrol commands can be examined and verified in software-defined networking before communication packet forwarding actions take place. Moreover, primary and back-up routes of telecontrol commands can be pre-engineered in software-defined networking to counteract potential cyberattacks.","PeriodicalId":212112,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 9th Workshop on Modeling and Simulation of Cyber-Physical Energy Systems","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 9th Workshop on Modeling and Simulation of Cyber-Physical Energy Systems","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3470481.3472707","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Abstract

Cybersecurity enhancement of power systems has become one of the main objectives of utility managers and regulatory agencies because of the increasing number of cyberattacks against critical infrastructures. In this paper, we investigate the application of software-defined networking for improving the cyber-resilience of power systems in the presence of cyberattacks using false telecontrol commands. It is first demonstrated that cyberattackers can use false telecontrol commands to separate a power plant from a power grid or trip a major transmission line. Next, it is shown that software-defined networking can significantly enhance the cyber-resilience of power systems in the presence of cyberattacks using false telecontrol commands compared to legacy communication networks. This is because the source, destination and protocol of telecontrol commands can be examined and verified in software-defined networking before communication packet forwarding actions take place. Moreover, primary and back-up routes of telecontrol commands can be pre-engineered in software-defined networking to counteract potential cyberattacks.

查看原文

微信好友朋友圈 QQ好友复制链接

本刊更多论文

使用软件定义网络实现网络弹性远程控制命令

由于针对关键基础设施的网络攻击越来越多，电力系统的网络安全增强已成为公用事业管理者和监管机构的主要目标之一。在本文中，我们研究了软件定义网络在使用虚假遥控命令进行网络攻击时提高电力系统网络弹性的应用。这是第一次证明网络攻击者可以使用虚假的遥控命令将发电厂从电网中分离出来或使主要输电线路中断。接下来，研究表明，与传统通信网络相比，软件定义网络可以显着增强电力系统在使用虚假遥控命令的网络攻击下的网络弹性。这是因为在软件定义网络中，远程控制命令的源、目的和协议可以在通信包转发动作发生之前进行检查和验证。此外，远程控制命令的主要和备份路由可以在软件定义网络中预先设计，以抵御潜在的网络攻击。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文去求助

来源期刊

Proceedings of the 9th Workshop on Modeling and Simulation of Cyber-Physical Energy Systems

自引率

0.00%

发文量