Institutional Transition and Local Decentralization of Power through Internal-Conflicts: A Model and Comparative History (内戦による地方分権化と制度移行のメカニズム -モデルと比較史-)

Takaharu Ishii
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This research investigates the factors. In addition, this research clarifies the turning point of institutional change by considering the mechanism of civil war through theory, its simulation, and case/empirical analysis. Also, when the support base of challengers during the civil war changes according to the ideology of the residents, the system reflects the ideology of the residents in terms of political economy. Although it is difficult to defeat the government by one power, if two or more political groups collaborate, we mainly consider the case where they have power over the government and consider what mechanism they should collaborate with two or more groups. what predictions themselves power after defeat the conflict after the alliance. When some political power decides whether they challenges the government, even if the power is weaker than the government, in the long run, it is expected that the challenger will defeat the civil war by the support of the residents of local and the third power. This paper provides that challenge to the ruler is the long-term optimal strategy for the challenger. Also, political instability has occurred in many countries, even if no the conflict takes place. One of the reasons for the political instability is the decentralization of power, but we will theoretically consider how decentralization of power occurs. This is due to the reduced ability of sanctions of the ruler against challengers and the lack of administration capability as economic side for the ruler. Our model introduces variables with political ideology and the administration capacity in economic side. we regards political ideology, there are regions with different utility functions by different ideology, because we think that people’s ideology are divided into the result equality egalitarian (socialist) ideology in rural area and opportunity equality egalitarian (capitalist) ideology in urban area. The important role of the government Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3655729 is to protect the property values of residents and to secure property rights and to provide public goods services. When the ruler fails to play an important role in the government, it will lose the support base of ruler and affect the outcome of the civil war. Consider a model in which the utility function of the residents includes the utility obtained from private goods and public goods, and the price level affects the value of private goods and public goods of people. 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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The English version of this paper can be found at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3655729

Japanese Abstract: 内戦が世界中で生じているが、その要因を探ることが本研究の目的である。 政府に対して単独で勝利は困難であるが、2つ以上のグループが提携することで、政府をしのぐ勢力を有するとき、どのようなメカニズムで提携するのかを考察する。提携後の内戦に勝利した後の予測を含め、考察する。 また、結果として内戦が生じないとしても、政権の不安定性は様々な国で生じている。政権の不安定性は権力の分散が大きな理由であるが、権力の分散がどのように生じるかを理論的に考察する。 政治イデオロギーと経済面での政権担当能力に関する指標を用いて分析を行う。イデオロギーについては、結果平等主義的なイデオロギーと機会平等主義のイデオロギーの2つに住民がわかれると考え、それぞれ異なる効用関数をもつ。政権担当能力は、住民の保有する資産価値の保全である財産権の保障や公共財のサービス提供能力が重要である。住民の効用関数に私的財と公共財を含め、物価水準によって私的財と公共財の価値に影響を与えるモデルを考える。物価水準が内戦に伴う武器輸入と国内債務残高に影響を受けるとする。 また内戦の勝利には、補給の確保のためにも国内の民衆や地方有力者による支持と軍事力が重要な要素といえる。軍事力を軍事技術と国内の支持にわけ、軍事技術の拡大が地方分権化をもたらすことを示す。軍事技術をもつが国内の支持がない、政権政党の政治的イデオロギーを支持する人数が少ない、経済安定性の観点から政権担当能力がないと判断されたとき、政府の相対的地位は弱体化し、地方分権化が生じるか、内戦を通じて政権は交代することを示す。

English Abstract: The conflict has taken place all over the world. This research investigates the factors. In addition, this research clarifies the turning point of institutional change by considering the mechanism of civil war through theory, its simulation, and case/empirical analysis. Also, when the support base of challengers during the civil war changes according to the ideology of the residents, the system reflects the ideology of the residents in terms of political economy. Although it is difficult to defeat the government by one power, if two or more political groups collaborate, we mainly consider the case where they have power over the government and consider what mechanism they should collaborate with two or more groups. what predictions themselves power after defeat the conflict after the alliance. When some political power decides whether they challenges the government, even if the power is weaker than the government, in the long run, it is expected that the challenger will defeat the civil war by the support of the residents of local and the third power. This paper provides that challenge to the ruler is the long-term optimal strategy for the challenger. Also, political instability has occurred in many countries, even if no the conflict takes place. One of the reasons for the political instability is the decentralization of power, but we will theoretically consider how decentralization of power occurs. This is due to the reduced ability of sanctions of the ruler against challengers and the lack of administration capability as economic side for the ruler. Our model introduces variables with political ideology and the administration capacity in economic side. we regards political ideology, there are regions with different utility functions by different ideology, because we think that people’s ideology are divided into the result equality egalitarian (socialist) ideology in rural area and opportunity equality egalitarian (capitalist) ideology in urban area. The important role of the government Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3655729 is to protect the property values of residents and to secure property rights and to provide public goods services. When the ruler fails to play an important role in the government, it will lose the support base of ruler and affect the outcome of the civil war. Consider a model in which the utility function of the residents includes the utility obtained from private goods and public goods, and the price level affects the value of private goods and public goods of people. It is assumed that the price level will be affected by weapons imports of the ruler and domestic debt balance influence in the conflict. Also, to secure supply, the support and military power of the domestic people and local powerful people are important factors for winning the civil war. We divide the elements of military power into military technology and domestic support and introduce the model that the rise of military technology leads to decentralization and domestic support to the challenger. When the government is judged that:

(1) they have military technology but do not have domestic support,

(2) few people support the political ideology of the ruling party, and

(3) they cannot administer the government from the perspective of economic stability by people.

It indicates that the relative position of the government will be weakened, decentralization will occur, or the ruler will change through the civil war. The decentralization of this study means that the challenger will continue to have a strong influence in the country after the civil war because the government cannot execute decisive sanctions despite the defeat of the challenger.
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Institutional Transition and Local Decentralization of Power through Internal-Conflicts:A Model and Comparative History(内战导致的地方分权化和制度转移的机制-模型和比较史-)
The English version of this paper can be found atabstract: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3655729japanese内战在世界各地发生,本研究的目的是寻找其原因。单独战胜政府是很困难的,当两个以上的集团联合起来,拥有凌驾于政府之上的势力时,我们将考察它们是通过什么样的机制进行合作的。考察包括在合作后的内战中获胜后的预测。而且,即使最终没有发生内战,政权的不稳定性也会在各个国家发生。政权的不稳定性最大的原因在于权力的分散,本文从理论上考察了权力的分散是如何产生的。通过政治意识形态和经济方面的执政能力指标进行分析。关于意识形态,他认为居民可以分为结果平等主义意识形态和机会平等主义意识形态两种,各自具有不同的效用函数。执政能力是指保障居民拥有的资产价值的财产权和提供公共财产服务的能力。考虑居民效用函数包括私人财产和公共财产,并根据物价水平影响私人财产和公共财产价值的模型。物价水平受到内战带来的武器进口和国内债务余额的影响。此外,为了确保补给,国内民众和地方权贵的支持和军事力量也是内战胜利的重要因素。军事力量分为军事技术和国内支持,这表明军事技术的扩大会带来地方分权化。拥有军事技术却没有国内支持,支持执政政党的政治意识形态的人数少,从经济稳定性的角度看,认为政府没有执政能力的时候,政府的相对地位就会弱化,地方分权化或通过内战。自己的政权表示交替。english abstract:The conflict has taken place all over The world. This research investigates The factors. Inaddition,this research clarifies the turning point of institutional change by considering the mechanism ofcivil war through theory, its simulation, and case/empirical analysis. Also,when the support base of challengers during the civil war changes according to the ideology of theresidents,the system reflects the ideology of the residents in terms of political economy. Although it isdifficult to defeat the government by one power, if two or more政治groups合作,we mainly consider the case where they have power over the government and consider what mechanismthey should collaborate with two or more groups. what predictions themselves power after defeat theconflict after the alliance. When some政治力量decides whether they challenges thegovernment, even if the power is weaker than the government, in the long run,it is expected that the challenger will defeat the civil war by the support of the residents oflocal and the third power. This paper provides that challenge to the ruler is the long-term optimalstrategy for the challenger. Also, political instability has occurred in many countries,even if no the conflict takes place. One of the reasons for the political instability is thedecentralization of power,but we will theoretically consider how decentralization of power occurs. This is due to the reducedability of sanctions of the ruler against challengers and the lack of administration capability aseconomic side for the ruler. Our model introduces variables with political ideology and theadministration capacity in economic side. we regards政治ideology,there are regions with different utility functions by different ideology,because we think that people’s ideology are divided into the result equality egalitarian (socialist)capitalist ideology in urban area. ideology in urban area.The important role of The government电子复制available at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=3655729 is to protect the property values of residents and to secureproperty rights and to provide public goods services. When the ruler fails to play an important rolein the government,it will lose the support base of ruler and affect the outcome of the civil war. Consider a model inwhich the utility function of the residents includes the utility obtained from private goods andpublic goods,and the price level affects private goods of value and public goods of people. It is assumedthat the price level will be affected by weapons imports of the ruler and domestic debt balanceinfluence in the conflict. Also, to secure supply,支持和军事力量of the domestic people and local powerful people are importantwinning the civil war. We divide the elements of military power into military technologyand domestic support and introduce the model that the rise of military technology leads todecentralization and domestic support to the challenger. When the government is judged that:(1) they have military technology but do not have domestic support,(2) few people support the政治ideology of the ruling party,and (3) they cannot administer the government from the perspective of economic stability by people.It indicates that the relative position of the government will be weakeneddecentralization will occur,or the ruler will change through the civil war. the decentralization of this study means that the挑战者will continue to have a strong influence in the country after the civil war because thegovernment cannot execute decisive sanctions despite the defeat of the challenger。
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