Mechanism of Institutional Transition and Local Decentralization of Power through Civil-Wars and Internal-Conflicts: A Model and Comparative History

Takaharu Ishii
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The conflict has taken place all over the world. This research investigates the factors. In addition, this research clarifies the turning point of institutional change by considering the mechanism of civil war through theory, its simulation, and case/empirical analysis. Also, when the support base of challengers during the civil war changes according to the ideology of the residents, the system reflects the ideology of the residents in terms of political economy. Although it is difficult to defeat the government by one power, if two or more political groups collaborate, we mainly consider the case where they have power over the government and consider what mechanism they should collaborate with two or more groups. what predictions themselves power after defeat the conflict after the alliance. When some political power decides whether they challenges the government, even if the power is weaker than the government, in the long run, it is expected that the challenger will defeat the civil war by the support of the residents of local and the third power. This paper provides that challenge to the ruler is the long-term optimal strategy for the challenger. Also, political instability has occurred in many countries, even if no the conflict takes place. One of the reasons for the political instability is the decentralization of power, but we will theoretically consider how decentralization of power occurs. This is due to the reduced ability of sanctions of the ruler against challengers and the lack of administration capability as economic side for the ruler. Our model introduces variables with political ideology and the administration capacity in economic side. we regards political ideology, there are regions with different utility functions by different ideology, because we think that people’s ideology are divided into the result equality egalitarian (socialist) ideology in rural area and opportunity equality egalitarian (capitalist) ideology in urban area. The important role of the government is to protect the property values of residents and to secure property rights and to provide public goods services. When the ruler fails to play an important role in the government, it will lose the support base of ruler and affect the outcome of the civil war. Consider a model in which the utility function of the residents includes the utility obtained from private goods and public goods, and the price level affects the value of private goods and public goods of people. It is assumed that the price level will be affected by weapons imports of the ruler and domestic debt balance influence in the conflict. Also, to secure supply, the support and military power of the domestic people and local powerful people are important factors for winning the civil war. We divide the elements of military power into military technology and domestic support and introduce the model that the rise of military technology leads to decentralization and domestic support to the challenger. When the government is judged that: (1) they have military technology but do not have domestic support, (2) few people support the political ideology of the ruling party, and (3) they cannot administer the government from the perspective of economic stability by people. It indicates that the relative position of the government will be weakened, decentralization will occur, or the ruler will change through the civil war. The decentralization of this study means that the challenger will continue to have a strong influence in the country after the civil war because the government cannot execute decisive sanctions despite the defeat of the challenger.
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内战与内部冲突中的制度变迁与地方分权机制:一个模型与比较历史
世界各地都发生了冲突。本研究调查了这些因素。此外,本研究还通过理论、模拟和案例/实证分析等方法,从内战的机制出发,厘清了制度变迁的拐点。此外,当内战时期挑战者的支持基础根据居民的意识形态发生变化时,该制度在政治经济方面反映了居民的意识形态。虽然一个权力很难打败政府,但如果两个或两个以上的政治团体合作,我们主要考虑他们对政府有权力的情况,考虑他们应该与两个或两个以上的团体合作的机制。什么预测自己的力量后击败后的冲突后的联盟。当某些政治权力决定是否挑战政府时,即使该权力比政府弱,从长远来看,挑战者也有望在当地居民和第三权力的支持下击败内战。本文认为,对统治者的挑战是挑战者的长期最优策略。此外,即使没有发生冲突,许多国家也发生了政治不稳定。政治不稳定的原因之一是权力分散,但我们将从理论上考虑权力分散是如何发生的。这是因为统治者对挑战者的制裁能力下降,以及作为统治者经济方面的行政能力不足。我们的模型在经济方面引入了政治意识形态和行政能力的变量。从政治意识形态上看,不同的意识形态有不同的效用函数区域,因为我们认为人们的意识形态分为农村地区的结果平等主义(社会主义)意识形态和城市地区的机会平等主义(资本主义)意识形态。政府的重要作用是保护居民的财产价值,保障产权,提供公共产品服务。当统治者不能在政府中发挥重要作用时,就会失去统治者的支持基础,影响内战的结果。考虑一个模型,其中居民的效用函数包括从私人物品和公共物品中获得的效用,价格水平影响人们的私人物品和公共物品的价值。假设价格水平将受到统治者武器进口和国内债务平衡在冲突中的影响。国内人民和地方权贵的支持和军事力量,保证供给,也是赢得内战的重要因素。我们将军事力量的要素划分为军事技术和国内支持,并引入军事技术的兴起导致权力下放和国内支持挑战者的模型。当政府被判断为:(1)有军事技术但没有国内支持;(2)很少有人支持执政党的政治意识形态;(3)不能从国民经济稳定的角度来管理政府。这表明政府的相对地位将被削弱,权力下放将发生,或者通过内战改变统治者。这项研究的分散性意味着挑战者将在内战后继续在该国产生强大的影响,因为尽管挑战者被击败,政府仍无法执行决定性的制裁。
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