This study is designed to examine the relationship between ethnic conflicts and minority agitations in the Niger-Delta Region of Nigeria in relation to poor or bad governance. It is observed that the so-called "National Question" remain the biggest issue facing Nigeria today given the controversies, doubts and experimentation that surrounds her search for balance and stability, and the minority tensions and agitations constitute an integral feature of the ongoing struggles to resolve the "National question". This study shows the ferment in which the majorities consume the Niger-Delta minorities in the domination of the Nigerian state. It revealed that these acts are sustained and strengthened by bad governance. This study considers the elite and frustration- aggression theories as the framework of analysis, ft was found that for ethnic conflicts and minority agitations in the Niger Delta to be solved; good governance through the practice of democracy needs to be installed to promote sustainable growth and development in Nigeria.
{"title":"Good Governance as a Panacea for Conflicts and Agitations in the Niger-Delta Region of Nigeria","authors":"Udochukwu Ogbaji, Chukwuma Ike, M. Ananti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3905983","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3905983","url":null,"abstract":"This study is designed to examine the relationship between ethnic conflicts and minority agitations in the Niger-Delta Region of Nigeria in relation to poor or bad governance. It is observed that the so-called \"National Question\" remain the biggest issue facing Nigeria today given the controversies, doubts and experimentation that surrounds her search for balance and stability, and the minority tensions and agitations constitute an integral feature of the ongoing struggles to resolve the \"National question\". This study shows the ferment in which the majorities consume the Niger-Delta minorities in the domination of the Nigerian state. It revealed that these acts are sustained and strengthened by bad governance. This study considers the elite and frustration- aggression theories as the framework of analysis, ft was found that for ethnic conflicts and minority agitations in the Niger Delta to be solved; good governance through the practice of democracy needs to be installed to promote sustainable growth and development in Nigeria.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"48 9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125732691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The conflict has taken place all over the world. This research investigates the factors. In addition, this research clarifies the turning point of institutional change by considering the mechanism of civil war through theory, its simulation, and case/empirical analysis. Also, when the support base of challengers during the civil war changes according to the ideology of the residents, the system reflects the ideology of the residents in terms of political economy. Although it is difficult to defeat the government by one power, if two or more political groups collaborate, we mainly consider the case where they have power over the government and consider what mechanism they should collaborate with two or more groups. what predictions themselves power after defeat the conflict after the alliance. When some political power decides whether they challenges the government, even if the power is weaker than the government, in the long run, it is expected that the challenger will defeat the civil war by the support of the residents of local and the third power. This paper provides that challenge to the ruler is the long-term optimal strategy for the challenger. Also, political instability has occurred in many countries, even if no the conflict takes place. One of the reasons for the political instability is the decentralization of power, but we will theoretically consider how decentralization of power occurs. This is due to the reduced ability of sanctions of the ruler against challengers and the lack of administration capability as economic side for the ruler. Our model introduces variables with political ideology and the administration capacity in economic side. we regards political ideology, there are regions with different utility functions by different ideology, because we think that people’s ideology are divided into the result equality egalitarian (socialist) ideology in rural area and opportunity equality egalitarian (capitalist) ideology in urban area. The important role of the government is to protect the property values of residents and to secure property rights and to provide public goods services. When the ruler fails to play an important role in the government, it will lose the support base of ruler and affect the outcome of the civil war. Consider a model in which the utility function of the residents includes the utility obtained from private goods and public goods, and the price level affects the value of private goods and public goods of people. It is assumed that the price level will be affected by weapons imports of the ruler and domestic debt balance influence in the conflict. Also, to secure supply, the support and military power of the domestic people and local powerful people are important factors for winning the civil war. We divide the elements of military power into military technology and domestic support and introduce the model that the rise of military technology leads to decentralization and domestic support to the
{"title":"Mechanism of Institutional Transition and Local Decentralization of Power through Civil-Wars and Internal-Conflicts: A Model and Comparative History","authors":"Takaharu Ishii","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3655729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3655729","url":null,"abstract":"The conflict has taken place all over the world. This research investigates the factors. In addition, this research clarifies the turning point of institutional change by considering the mechanism of civil war through theory, its simulation, and case/empirical analysis. Also, when the support base of challengers during the civil war changes according to the ideology of the residents, the system reflects the ideology of the residents in terms of political economy. \u0000 \u0000Although it is difficult to defeat the government by one power, if two or more political groups collaborate, we mainly consider the case where they have power over the government and consider what mechanism they should collaborate with two or more groups. what predictions themselves power after defeat the conflict after the alliance. When some political power decides whether they challenges the government, even if the power is weaker than the government, in the long run, it is expected that the challenger will defeat the civil war by the support of the residents of local and the third power. This paper provides that challenge to the ruler is the long-term optimal strategy for the challenger. \u0000 \u0000Also, political instability has occurred in many countries, even if no the conflict takes place. One of the reasons for the political instability is the decentralization of power, but we will theoretically consider how decentralization of power occurs. This is due to the reduced ability of sanctions of the ruler against challengers and the lack of administration capability as economic side for the ruler. \u0000 \u0000Our model introduces variables with political ideology and the administration capacity in economic side. we regards political ideology, there are regions with different utility functions by different ideology, because we think that people’s ideology are divided into the result equality egalitarian (socialist) ideology in rural area and opportunity equality egalitarian (capitalist) ideology in urban area. The important role of the government is to protect the property values of residents and to secure property rights and to provide public goods services. When the ruler fails to play an important role in the government, it will lose the support base of ruler and affect the outcome of the civil war. Consider a model in which the utility function of the residents includes the utility obtained from private goods and public goods, and the price level affects the value of private goods and public goods of people. It is assumed that the price level will be affected by weapons imports of the ruler and domestic debt balance influence in the conflict. \u0000 \u0000Also, to secure supply, the support and military power of the domestic people and local powerful people are important factors for winning the civil war. We divide the elements of military power into military technology and domestic support and introduce the model that the rise of military technology leads to decentralization and domestic support to the","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128644080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study investigates the impact of humanitarian military interventions (HMIs) on conflict termination, conflict escalation, economic output and democratic performance using panel data on 144 countries covering time-period of 1960-2018. There is no scholarly consensus about whether HMIs are an effective mean of enforcing peace and causing economic and political stabilities. Our contribution is empirical and we use recently developed database on HMIs by the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. The results from multivariate analyses suggest that neutral interventions have positive impact on conflict termination whereas biased interventions, particularly against rebels, tend to escalate conflict. Neutral interventions have no significant negative impact on output whereas HMIs biased against governments and rebels lead to around 9 -8 percent decrease in per capita output. Finally, neutral and against governments HMIs lead to increase in democracy score. We estimate both contemporaneous and long-run decaying effects and as robustness check also carry out IV regressions with instruments constructed using Lewbel method.
{"title":"Political and Economic Consequences of Humanitarian Military Interventions in Targeted Nations","authors":"Luqman Saeed","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3731845","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3731845","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the impact of humanitarian military interventions (HMIs) on conflict termination, conflict escalation, economic output and democratic performance using panel data on 144 countries covering time-period of 1960-2018. There is no scholarly consensus about whether HMIs are an effective mean of enforcing peace and causing economic and political stabilities. Our contribution is empirical and we use recently developed database on HMIs by the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. The results from multivariate analyses suggest that neutral interventions have positive impact on conflict termination whereas biased interventions, particularly against rebels, tend to escalate conflict. Neutral interventions have no significant negative impact on output whereas HMIs biased against governments and rebels lead to around 9 -8 percent decrease in per capita output. Finally, neutral and against governments HMIs lead to increase in democracy score. We estimate both contemporaneous and long-run decaying effects and as robustness check also carry out IV regressions with instruments constructed using Lewbel method.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123125570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents a tractable and parsimonious theory of political revolutions in societies devoid of democratic processes. I frame a society constituting a ruler seeking to prevent uprising and a revolutionary leader attempting to induce revolt. Both seek to appeal to a populace consisting of elites and workers by implementing concessionary policies. Due to limited resources, policies benefiting the elite confer disutility to workers, and vice versa. Workers and elites face a binary choice between loyalism and revolution, and their decision affects the likelihood that a revolution succeeds. Since the ruler seeks to minimise the risk of being deposed, the ruler threatens to punish both workers and elites as a deterrent. The propensity of workers to revolt depends on current and proposed policies, their risk profiles, the elites' decision, and the punishment levied. The equilibrium number of revolutionaries depends on the convexity of the probability of successful insurrection.
{"title":"An Economic Theory of Political Revolutions","authors":"Matthew Lee Chen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3453625","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3453625","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a tractable and parsimonious theory of political revolutions in societies devoid of democratic processes. I frame a society constituting a ruler seeking to prevent uprising and a revolutionary leader attempting to induce revolt. Both seek to appeal to a populace consisting of elites and workers by implementing concessionary policies. Due to limited resources, policies benefiting the elite confer disutility to workers, and vice versa. Workers and elites face a binary choice between loyalism and revolution, and their decision affects the likelihood that a revolution succeeds. Since the ruler seeks to minimise the risk of being deposed, the ruler threatens to punish both workers and elites as a deterrent. The propensity of workers to revolt depends on current and proposed policies, their risk profiles, the elites' decision, and the punishment levied. The equilibrium number of revolutionaries depends on the convexity of the probability of successful insurrection.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123849603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides an analysis of the costs of conflict for the countries that are most affected by it, namely low‐income and fragile countries in Africa. It provides an analysis of the impact of conflict on economic growth using a panel of African countries and investigates the differences between those categorized as fragile and others. It finds that there are significant differences, with fragile countries most affected by conflict. It also considers the potential spillover effects of conflict and finds that fragile states also suffer more from conflicts within neighboring states. Finally, it considers whether the results are robust to endogeneity of the conflict variable. Using instrumental variable estimation confirms the negative effect of conflict and the larger effects on fragile states and gives even larger coefficient estimates.
{"title":"Costs of Civil War and Fragile States in Africa","authors":"J. Dunne, Nan Tian","doi":"10.1111/rode.12612","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12612","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides an analysis of the costs of conflict for the countries that are most affected by it, namely low‐income and fragile countries in Africa. It provides an analysis of the impact of conflict on economic growth using a panel of African countries and investigates the differences between those categorized as fragile and others. It finds that there are significant differences, with fragile countries most affected by conflict. It also considers the potential spillover effects of conflict and finds that fragile states also suffer more from conflicts within neighboring states. Finally, it considers whether the results are robust to endogeneity of the conflict variable. Using instrumental variable estimation confirms the negative effect of conflict and the larger effects on fragile states and gives even larger coefficient estimates.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122021387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Japanese Abstract: 内戦が世界中で生じているが、その要因を探ることが本研究の目的である。 政府に対して単独で勝利は困難であるが、2つ以上のグループが提携することで、政府をしのぐ勢力を有するとき、どのようなメカニズムで提携するのかを考察する。提携後の内戦に勝利した後の予測を含め、考察する。 また、結果として内戦が生じないとしても、政権の不安定性は様々な国で生じている。政権の不安定性は権力の分散が大きな理由であるが、権力の分散がどのように生じるかを理論的に考察する。 政治イデオロギーと経済面での政権担当能力に関する指標を用いて分析を行う。イデオロギーについては、結果平等主義的なイデオロギーと機会平等主義のイデオロギーの２つに住民がわかれると考え、それぞれ異なる効用関数をもつ。政権担当能力は、住民の保有する資産価値の保全である財産権の保障や公共財のサービス提供能力が重要である。住民の効用関数に私的財と公共財を含め、物価水準によって私的財と公共財の価値に影響を与えるモデルを考える。物価水準が内戦に伴う武器輸入と国内債務残高に影響を受けるとする。 また内戦の勝利には、補給の確保のためにも国内の民衆や地方有力者による支持と軍事力が重要な要素といえる。軍事力を軍事技術と国内の支持にわけ、軍事技術の拡大が地方分権化をもたらすことを示す。軍事技術をもつが国内の支持がない、政権政党の政治的イデオロギーを支持する人数が少ない、経済安定性の観点から政権担当能力がないと判断されたとき、政府の相対的地位は弱体化し、地方分権化が生じるか、内戦を通じて政権は交代することを示す。
English Abstract: The conflict has taken place all over the world. This research investigates the factors. In addition, this research clarifies the turning point of institutional change by considering the mechanism of civil war through theory, its simulation, and case/empirical analysis. Also, when the support base of challengers during the civil war changes according to the ideology of the residents, the system reflects the ideology of the residents in terms of political economy. Although it is difficult to defeat the government by one power, if two or more political groups collaborate, we mainly consider the case where they have power over the government and consider what mechanism they should collaborate with two or more groups. what predictions themselves power after defeat the conflict after the alliance. When some political power decides whether they challenges the government, even if the power is weaker than the government, in the long run, it is expected that the challenger will defeat the civil war by the support of the residents of local and the third power. This paper provides that challenge to the ruler is the long-term optimal strategy for the challenger. Also, political instability has occurred in many countries, even if no the conflict takes place. One of the reasons for the political instability is the decentralization of power, but we will theoretically consider how decentralization of power occurs. This is due to the reduced ability of sanctions of the ruler against challengers and the lack of administration capability as economic side for the ruler. Our model introduces variables with political ideology and the administration capacity in economic side. we regards political ideology, there are regions with different utility functions by different ideology, because we think that people’s ideology are divided into the result equality egalitarian (socialist) ideology in rural area and opportunity equality egalitarian (capitalist) ideology in urban area. The important role of the government Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3655729 is to protect the property values of residents and to se
The English version of this paper can be found atabstract: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3655729japanese内战在世界各地发生，本研究的目的是寻找其原因。单独战胜政府是很困难的，当两个以上的集团联合起来，拥有凌驾于政府之上的势力时，我们将考察它们是通过什么样的机制进行合作的。考察包括在合作后的内战中获胜后的预测。而且，即使最终没有发生内战，政权的不稳定性也会在各个国家发生。政权的不稳定性最大的原因在于权力的分散，本文从理论上考察了权力的分散是如何产生的。通过政治意识形态和经济方面的执政能力指标进行分析。关于意识形态，他认为居民可以分为结果平等主义意识形态和机会平等主义意识形态两种，各自具有不同的效用函数。执政能力是指保障居民拥有的资产价值的财产权和提供公共财产服务的能力。考虑居民效用函数包括私人财产和公共财产，并根据物价水平影响私人财产和公共财产价值的模型。物价水平受到内战带来的武器进口和国内债务余额的影响。此外，为了确保补给，国内民众和地方权贵的支持和军事力量也是内战胜利的重要因素。军事力量分为军事技术和国内支持，这表明军事技术的扩大会带来地方分权化。拥有军事技术却没有国内支持，支持执政政党的政治意识形态的人数少，从经济稳定性的角度看，认为政府没有执政能力的时候，政府的相对地位就会弱化，地方分权化或通过内战。自己的政权表示交替。english abstract:The conflict has taken place all over The world. This research investigates The factors. Inaddition,this research clarifies the turning point of institutional change by considering the mechanism ofcivil war through theory, its simulation, and case/empirical analysis. Also，when the support base of challengers during the civil war changes according to the ideology of theresidents,the system reflects the ideology of the residents in terms of political economy. Although it isdifficult to defeat the government by one power, if two or more政治groups合作，we mainly consider the case where they have power over the government and consider what mechanismthey should collaborate with two or more groups. what predictions themselves power after defeat theconflict after the alliance. When some政治力量decides whether they challenges thegovernment, even if the power is weaker than the government, in the long run，it is expected that the challenger will defeat the civil war by the support of the residents oflocal and the third power. This paper provides that challenge to the ruler is the long-term optimalstrategy for the challenger. Also, political instability has occurred in many countries，even if no the conflict takes place. One of the reasons for the political instability is thedecentralization of power，but we will theoretically consider how decentralization of power occurs. This is due to the reducedability of sanctions of the ruler against challengers and the lack of administration capability aseconomic side for the ruler. Our model introduces variables with political ideology and theadministration capacity in economic side. we regards政治ideology，there are regions with different utility functions by different ideology，because we think that people’s ideology are divided into the result equality egalitarian (socialist)capitalist ideology in urban area. ideology in urban area.The important role of The government电子复制available at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=3655729 is to protect the property values of residents and to secureproperty rights and to provide public goods services. When the ruler fails to play an important rolein the government，it will lose the support base of ruler and affect the outcome of the civil war. Consider a model inwhich the utility function of the residents includes the utility obtained from private good
{"title":"Institutional Transition and Local Decentralization of Power through Internal-Conflicts: A Model and Comparative History (内戦による地方分権化と制度移行のメカニズム -モデルと比較史-)","authors":"Takaharu Ishii","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3412456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3412456","url":null,"abstract":"The English version of this paper can be found at <a> https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3655729</a><br><br><b>Japanese Abstract:</b> 内戦が世界中で生じているが、その要因を探ることが本研究の目的である。 政府に対して単独で勝利は困難であるが、2つ以上のグループが提携することで、政府をしのぐ勢力を有するとき、どのようなメカニズムで提携するのかを考察する。提携後の内戦に勝利した後の予測を含め、考察する。 また、結果として内戦が生じないとしても、政権の不安定性は様々な国で生じている。政権の不安定性は権力の分散が大きな理由であるが、権力の分散がどのように生じるかを理論的に考察する。 政治イデオロギーと経済面での政権担当能力に関する指標を用いて分析を行う。イデオロギーについては、結果平等主義的なイデオロギーと機会平等主義のイデオロギーの２つに住民がわかれると考え、それぞれ異なる効用関数をもつ。政権担当能力は、住民の保有する資産価値の保全である財産権の保障や公共財のサービス提供能力が重要である。住民の効用関数に私的財と公共財を含め、物価水準によって私的財と公共財の価値に影響を与えるモデルを考える。物価水準が内戦に伴う武器輸入と国内債務残高に影響を受けるとする。 また内戦の勝利には、補給の確保のためにも国内の民衆や地方有力者による支持と軍事力が重要な要素といえる。軍事力を軍事技術と国内の支持にわけ、軍事技術の拡大が地方分権化をもたらすことを示す。軍事技術をもつが国内の支持がない、政権政党の政治的イデオロギーを支持する人数が少ない、経済安定性の観点から政権担当能力がないと判断されたとき、政府の相対的地位は弱体化し、地方分権化が生じるか、内戦を通じて政権は交代することを示す。<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> The conflict has taken place all over the world. This research investigates the factors. In addition, this research clarifies the turning point of institutional change by considering the mechanism of civil war through theory, its simulation, and case/empirical analysis. Also, when the support base of challengers during the civil war changes according to the ideology of the residents, the system reflects the ideology of the residents in terms of political economy. Although it is difficult to defeat the government by one power, if two or more political groups collaborate, we mainly consider the case where they have power over the government and consider what mechanism they should collaborate with two or more groups. what predictions themselves power after defeat the conflict after the alliance. When some political power decides whether they challenges the government, even if the power is weaker than the government, in the long run, it is expected that the challenger will defeat the civil war by the support of the residents of local and the third power. This paper provides that challenge to the ruler is the long-term optimal strategy for the challenger. Also, political instability has occurred in many countries, even if no the conflict takes place. One of the reasons for the political instability is the decentralization of power, but we will theoretically consider how decentralization of power occurs. This is due to the reduced ability of sanctions of the ruler against challengers and the lack of administration capability as economic side for the ruler. Our model introduces variables with political ideology and the administration capacity in economic side. we regards political ideology, there are regions with different utility functions by different ideology, because we think that people’s ideology are divided into the result equality egalitarian (socialist) ideology in rural area and opportunity equality egalitarian (capitalist) ideology in urban area. The important role of the government Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3655729 is to protect the property values of residents and to se","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121445014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Current meta-analysis investigates how conflict management plays vital role to articulate positive side of conflict and enhance the team performance. According to criteria, 30 studies empirically analyzed on the topic the constructive controversy and its impact on conflict resolution among team members. Correlation values were taken from studies (2001 to 2010) for analysis. Result shows positive significant relationship exist between constructive controversy and team performance. Findings further revealed team performance increases when conflicting issues solved through cooperation, positive attitudes actively participation of team members.
{"title":"Conflict Resolution with Constructive Controversy, Team Performance: A Meta-Analysis","authors":"Syeda Nimra Batool, Hassan Imam","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3380120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3380120","url":null,"abstract":"Current meta-analysis investigates how conflict management plays vital role to articulate positive side of conflict and enhance the team performance. According to criteria, 30 studies empirically analyzed on the topic the constructive controversy and its impact on conflict resolution among team members. Correlation values were taken from studies (2001 to 2010) for analysis. Result shows positive significant relationship exist between constructive controversy and team performance. Findings further revealed team performance increases when conflicting issues solved through cooperation, positive attitudes actively participation of team members.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130823747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the effect of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict on various education outcomes for Palestinian high school students in the West Bank during the Second Intifada (2000–2006). Exploiting within-school variation in the number of conflict-related Palestinian fatalities during the academic year, we show that the conflict reduces the probability of passing the final exam, the total test score, and the probability of being admitted to university. The effect of conflict varies with the type and the timing of the violent events the student is exposed to and it is not significant for students in the upper tail of the test score distribution. We discuss various possible transmission mechanisms explaining our main result. Evidence suggests a role for both the conflict-induced deterioration of school infrastructures and the worsening in the student's psychological well-being due to direct exposure to violent events.
{"title":"Learning the Hard Way: The Effect of Violent Conflict on Student Academic Achievement","authors":"Tilman Brück, Michele Di Maio, Sami H. Miaari","doi":"10.1093/JEEA/JVY051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JEEA/JVY051","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We study the effect of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict on various education outcomes for Palestinian high school students in the West Bank during the Second Intifada (2000–2006). Exploiting within-school variation in the number of conflict-related Palestinian fatalities during the academic year, we show that the conflict reduces the probability of passing the final exam, the total test score, and the probability of being admitted to university. The effect of conflict varies with the type and the timing of the violent events the student is exposed to and it is not significant for students in the upper tail of the test score distribution. We discuss various possible transmission mechanisms explaining our main result. Evidence suggests a role for both the conflict-induced deterioration of school infrastructures and the worsening in the student's psychological well-being due to direct exposure to violent events.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117035764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When pursuing economic reforms in post-conflict and fragile states, development practitioners typically seek to establish an institutional framework within which markets can effectively function, price signals are accurate, and rents are eliminated. Establishment of market-enabling ‘good governance’ institutions is expected to lead to improvements in resource allocation, supporting improved living standards, employment creation, and access to services, thereby mitigating conflict pressures. Recent political economy theory, however, directly challenges the current ‘good governance’ orthodoxy, suggesting that the rents that reformers seek to eliminate through ‘good governance’ reforms serve a vital social purpose in maintaining elite pacts and thereby preventing violence. Through a survey of recent theoretical and empirical literature, I identify core unresolved contradictions and incompatibilities between the ‘good governance’ agenda and recent institutionalist theories of political order. Given limited empirical evidence that orthodox approaches are delivering expected results, I conclude that those working on economic reform in post-conflict and fragile states may need to revisit core assumptions that efforts to embed ‘good governance’ institutions will lead consistently to security and development.
{"title":"A ‘Good Governance’ Paradox? Reexamining Reform of Economic Institutions in Post-Conflict Contexts","authors":"T. Haque","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3163933","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3163933","url":null,"abstract":"When pursuing economic reforms in post-conflict and fragile states, development practitioners typically seek to establish an institutional framework within which markets can effectively function, price signals are accurate, and rents are eliminated. Establishment of market-enabling ‘good governance’ institutions is expected to lead to improvements in resource allocation, supporting improved living standards, employment creation, and access to services, thereby mitigating conflict pressures. Recent political economy theory, however, directly challenges the current ‘good governance’ orthodoxy, suggesting that the rents that reformers seek to eliminate through ‘good governance’ reforms serve a vital social purpose in maintaining elite pacts and thereby preventing violence. Through a survey of recent theoretical and empirical literature, I identify core unresolved contradictions and incompatibilities between the ‘good governance’ agenda and recent institutionalist theories of political order. Given limited empirical evidence that orthodox approaches are delivering expected results, I conclude that those working on economic reform in post-conflict and fragile states may need to revisit core assumptions that efforts to embed ‘good governance’ institutions will lead consistently to security and development.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129552889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Spanish Abstract: En este documento se estudian las relaciones causales entre conflicto armado, disuasión del crimen y violencia homicida. Se emplean datos de corte transversal a nivel municipal que comprenden el periodo del 2000 al 2014. El estudio utiliza una muestra que contiene aquellos municipios que tuvieron presencia del Estado en 1794 y a los municipios adyacentes. Lo anterior con el fin de tener una muestra más homogénea y realizar comparaciones entre municipios similares. La estrategia de identificación emplea efectos fijos de municipios vecinos, variable instrumental y análisis de mediación. Como variable instrumental se utiliza la distancia lineal de la cabecera municipal a la frontera de la zona de distensión, creada en 1998. Los resultados muestran que indicadores de disuasión del crimen, como fuerza policial y capturas, se afectan negativamente por la presencia del conflicto armado. Pero que este efecto negativo no es la causa de un aumento en los homicidios municipales. Por tanto, se muestra que la fuerza policial y las capturas no son canales a través de los cuales el conflicto afecta a los homicidios. Por último, se encuentran efectos heterogéneos de la presencia histórica de Estado. En aquellos municipios con una presencia más larga del Estado en el tiempo, el gobierno asigna mayor número de policías como respuesta al conflicto armado. Como consecuencia de esto, las tasas de homicidios en esos municipios disminuyen. English Abstract: In this paper the causal relation between arm conflict, crime dissuasion and homicides are studied. Municipal cross-sectional data are used, covering the period from 2000 to 2014. The study uses a sample that contains those municipalities that had presence of the State in 1794 and adjacent municipalities. The previous in order to achieve a homogeneous sample and make comparisons between similar areas. The identification strategy uses neighbor-pair fixed effects, instrumental variable and mediation analysis. The linear distance of the municipal seat to the boarder of the demilitarized zona (El Caguán), created in 1998, is used as an instrumental variable. The results show that crime dissuasion indicators, such as police force and captures, are negatively affected by the presence of armed conflict. But that this negative effect is not the cause of an increase in municipal homicides. Therefore, it is shown that the police force and the captures are not channels through which the conflict affects homicides. Finally, there are heterogeneous effects of the historical presence of the State. In those municipalities with a longer presence of the State over time, the government assigns more police as a response to the armed conflict. Consequently, homicide rates in those municipalities decrease.
{"title":"Conflicto Armado, Estado Y Homicidios En Colombia: Una Aproximación a Nivel Local (Armed Conflict, State and Homicide in Colombia: A Local-Level Approach)","authors":"Camila Patiño","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3161647","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3161647","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Spanish Abstract:</b> En este documento se estudian las relaciones causales entre conflicto armado, disuasión del crimen y violencia homicida. Se emplean datos de corte transversal a nivel municipal que comprenden el periodo del 2000 al 2014. El estudio utiliza una muestra que contiene aquellos municipios que tuvieron presencia del Estado en 1794 y a los municipios adyacentes. Lo anterior con el fin de tener una muestra más homogénea y realizar comparaciones entre municipios similares. La estrategia de identificación emplea efectos fijos de municipios vecinos, variable instrumental y análisis de mediación. Como variable instrumental se utiliza la distancia lineal de la cabecera municipal a la frontera de la zona de distensión, creada en 1998. Los resultados muestran que indicadores de disuasión del crimen, como fuerza policial y capturas, se afectan negativamente por la presencia del conflicto armado. Pero que este efecto negativo no es la causa de un aumento en los homicidios municipales. Por tanto, se muestra que la fuerza policial y las capturas no son canales a través de los cuales el conflicto afecta a los homicidios. Por último, se encuentran efectos heterogéneos de la presencia histórica de Estado. En aquellos municipios con una presencia más larga del Estado en el tiempo, el gobierno asigna mayor número de policías como respuesta al conflicto armado. Como consecuencia de esto, las tasas de homicidios en esos municipios disminuyen. <b>English Abstract:</b> In this paper the causal relation between arm conflict, crime dissuasion and homicides are studied. Municipal cross-sectional data are used, covering the period from 2000 to 2014. The study uses a sample that contains those municipalities that had presence of the State in 1794 and adjacent municipalities. The previous in order to achieve a homogeneous sample and make comparisons between similar areas. The identification strategy uses neighbor-pair fixed effects, instrumental variable and mediation analysis. The linear distance of the municipal seat to the boarder of the demilitarized zona (El Caguán), created in 1998, is used as an instrumental variable. The results show that crime dissuasion indicators, such as police force and captures, are negatively affected by the presence of armed conflict. But that this negative effect is not the cause of an increase in municipal homicides. Therefore, it is shown that the police force and the captures are not channels through which the conflict affects homicides. Finally, there are heterogeneous effects of the historical presence of the State. In those municipalities with a longer presence of the State over time, the government assigns more police as a response to the armed conflict. Consequently, homicide rates in those municipalities decrease.","PeriodicalId":127641,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122867004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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