{"title":"Sunshine’s Shadow: Overbroad Open Meetings Laws as Content-Based, Distinct from Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, and Constitutionally Suspect","authors":"Steven J. Mulroy","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2476601","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this Article, Professor Mulroy discusses “strict” open meetings laws applicable in many states to local legislators — laws which restrict substantive discussion of government business even among two or three legislators (far short of a quorum) outside a properly noticed public meeting, and/or which contain no exceptions for sensitive, privacy-invasive topics which might legitimately warrant private deliberation at early stages. Such laws are surprisingly common and broad, and stand in stark contrast to the lack of such restrictions applicable to most state legislators and all federal legislators. Drawing on a novel Fifth Circuit case criticizing such laws, Prof. Mulroy’s prior Tennessee Law Review Article had argued that such laws are overbroad speech restrictions. This new Article draws on a new Fifth Circuit case upholding such laws, and analyzes two relatively new arguments in the defense of such laws. First, this Article argues that such strict “sunshine” laws cannot be defended by analogizing them to campaign finance disclosure laws upheld in the Supreme Court’s Citizens United case and its progeny, because the government interests justifying such disclosure laws do not apply with equal force to strict sunshine rules. In so doing, it discusses the 2014 Supreme Court decision in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission. Second, it argues that such laws are properly analyzed as “content-based” speech restrictions triggering “strict scrutiny” constitutional review. In so doing, the Article discusses the 2014 Supreme Court decision in McCullen v. Oakley. It synthesizes the surprisingly muddled Supreme Court guidance on when to analyze a speech restriction as content-based, criticizes part of the current doctrine on this question, and argues for a straightforward “purely facial” approach which always treats a law as content-based if the law’s application turns on the content of the speech involved. Along the way, it explains many of the counterintuitive, harmful effects of overbroad sunshine laws, including their tendency to chill discussion, hinder compromise, force inappropriate disclosure of sensitive information, breed widespread noncompliance and contempt for the law, and transfer power from legislators to unelected staff and lobbyists.","PeriodicalId":415389,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Campaign Finance Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PSN: Campaign Finance Law & Policy (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2476601","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In this Article, Professor Mulroy discusses “strict” open meetings laws applicable in many states to local legislators — laws which restrict substantive discussion of government business even among two or three legislators (far short of a quorum) outside a properly noticed public meeting, and/or which contain no exceptions for sensitive, privacy-invasive topics which might legitimately warrant private deliberation at early stages. Such laws are surprisingly common and broad, and stand in stark contrast to the lack of such restrictions applicable to most state legislators and all federal legislators. Drawing on a novel Fifth Circuit case criticizing such laws, Prof. Mulroy’s prior Tennessee Law Review Article had argued that such laws are overbroad speech restrictions. This new Article draws on a new Fifth Circuit case upholding such laws, and analyzes two relatively new arguments in the defense of such laws. First, this Article argues that such strict “sunshine” laws cannot be defended by analogizing them to campaign finance disclosure laws upheld in the Supreme Court’s Citizens United case and its progeny, because the government interests justifying such disclosure laws do not apply with equal force to strict sunshine rules. In so doing, it discusses the 2014 Supreme Court decision in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission. Second, it argues that such laws are properly analyzed as “content-based” speech restrictions triggering “strict scrutiny” constitutional review. In so doing, the Article discusses the 2014 Supreme Court decision in McCullen v. Oakley. It synthesizes the surprisingly muddled Supreme Court guidance on when to analyze a speech restriction as content-based, criticizes part of the current doctrine on this question, and argues for a straightforward “purely facial” approach which always treats a law as content-based if the law’s application turns on the content of the speech involved. Along the way, it explains many of the counterintuitive, harmful effects of overbroad sunshine laws, including their tendency to chill discussion, hinder compromise, force inappropriate disclosure of sensitive information, breed widespread noncompliance and contempt for the law, and transfer power from legislators to unelected staff and lobbyists.
在这篇文章中,马尔罗伊教授讨论了适用于许多州的地方立法者的“严格的”公开会议法律,这些法律限制了在适当的公开会议之外,甚至在两三个立法者(远低于法定人数)之间对政府事务的实质性讨论,并且/或者对敏感的、侵犯隐私的话题没有例外,这些话题可能合法地要求在早期阶段进行私人审议。这些法律出奇地普遍和广泛,与大多数州立法者和所有联邦立法者缺乏此类限制形成鲜明对比。马尔罗伊教授之前在《田纳西法律评论》上发表的一篇文章,引用了第五巡回法院一个批评此类法律的新案例,认为此类法律是过于宽泛的言论限制。这篇新文章借鉴了一个新的第五巡回法院案例,支持这些法律,并分析了为这些法律辩护的两个相对较新的论点。首先,本文认为,这种严格的“阳光”法律不能与最高法院“联合公民”案及其后续案件中支持的竞选资金披露法相提并论,因为政府利益证明这种披露法的正当性并不等同于严格的阳光规则。在此过程中,它讨论了2014年最高法院对麦卡琴诉联邦选举委员会的裁决。其次,它认为,这些法律被恰当地分析为“基于内容的”言论限制,引发了“严格审查”的宪法审查。在此过程中,本文讨论了2014年最高法院对麦卡伦诉奥克利案(McCullen v. Oakley)的判决。它综合了最高法院关于何时将言论限制分析为基于内容的令人惊讶的混乱的指导意见,批评了目前关于这个问题的部分原则,并主张一种直截了当的“纯粹表面”方法,即如果法律的适用取决于所涉及的言论的内容,则总是将法律视为基于内容的法律。在此过程中,它解释了过于宽泛的阳光法的许多违反直觉的有害影响,包括它们倾向于冷却讨论,阻碍妥协,强迫敏感信息的不当披露,滋生广泛的不遵守和蔑视法律,以及将权力从立法者转移到未经选举的工作人员和游说者手中。