We investigate political contributions made by municipal underwriters under the regulation of Rule G- 37, which requires detailed disclosure and prohibits contributing underwriters from conducting municipal securities business for two years if the contribution exceeds $250. We find that underwriters can circumvent the rule by making multi-small donations (multiple contributions under the de minimis limit of $250) and such strategy leads to a significant increase in their negotiated market shares. Large donations (contributions above the de minimis limit of $250) are also associated with higher future market shares, but with a two-year delay. Further analyses show that these effects are primarily driven by contributions to elected officials. Large donations are primarily targeted to states with fast growing negotiated bond issuance but where the underwriter has not had much business success. By contrast, underwriters tend to make substantial donations to political parties in states where they have already established strong underwriting relations. We also provide evidence that underwriters making large donations on average charge higher underwriting fees. Our findings suggest that underwriters adopt different strategies to build connections with municipal issuers and political contributions still play an influential role even after the implementation of Rule G-37.
{"title":"Pay Now, Play Later: Political Contributions and Underwriting Relationships in the Muni Market","authors":"Steve Liu, Z. Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3945089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3945089","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate political contributions made by municipal underwriters under the regulation of Rule G- 37, which requires detailed disclosure and prohibits contributing underwriters from conducting municipal securities business for two years if the contribution exceeds $250. We find that underwriters can circumvent the rule by making multi-small donations (multiple contributions under the de minimis limit of $250) and such strategy leads to a significant increase in their negotiated market shares. Large donations (contributions above the de minimis limit of $250) are also associated with higher future market shares, but with a two-year delay. Further analyses show that these effects are primarily driven by contributions to elected officials. Large donations are primarily targeted to states with fast growing negotiated bond issuance but where the underwriter has not had much business success. By contrast, underwriters tend to make substantial donations to political parties in states where they have already established strong underwriting relations. We also provide evidence that underwriters making large donations on average charge higher underwriting fees. Our findings suggest that underwriters adopt different strategies to build connections with municipal issuers and political contributions still play an influential role even after the implementation of Rule G-37.","PeriodicalId":415389,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Campaign Finance Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130901528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The current state of campaign finance laws is undermining the democratic system, yet various limits on the amounts that can be donated were considered by the Supreme Court to violate the First Amendment. This article proposes that instead of focusing on limiting what people can give to politicians seeking office — limiting what they can get in return for their contributions. Cases of mutually-beneficial exchange should be treated as bribery, so long as the benefit applies to the contributor in a discriminatory manner. For this approach to be successful, the current interpretation of quid pro quo corruption needs to be modified.
{"title":"Donors: Give - OK, Get - Not","authors":"Amitai Etzioni","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2851989","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2851989","url":null,"abstract":"The current state of campaign finance laws is undermining the democratic system, yet various limits on the amounts that can be donated were considered by the Supreme Court to violate the First Amendment. This article proposes that instead of focusing on limiting what people can give to politicians seeking office — limiting what they can get in return for their contributions. Cases of mutually-beneficial exchange should be treated as bribery, so long as the benefit applies to the contributor in a discriminatory manner. For this approach to be successful, the current interpretation of quid pro quo corruption needs to be modified.","PeriodicalId":415389,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Campaign Finance Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"77 8","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131879359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Following the 2010 U.S. Supreme Court’s decision on Citizens United v FEC, interest groups engaging in outside spending can receive unlimited contributions from unions and corporations. Critics of the decision have rejected the notion, espoused by the majority opinion, that outside spending does not corrupt or distort the electoral process. Fewer, however, have examined the decision’s implications under the Court’s assumptions. Using a game-theoretic model of electoral competition, we show that informative outside spending from a group whose policy preferences are partially aligned with the electorate may reduce voter welfare. This negative effect is more likely to arise when the value of the interest group’s information is large, or congruence between voters and the interest group is high. Further, the regulatory environment produced by the Court’s decision is inefficient: the electorate would be better off if either outside spending were banned or coordination between candidates and the interest group allowed.
{"title":"Citizens United: A Theoretical Evaluation","authors":"Carlo G. Prato, Stephane Wolton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2790175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2790175","url":null,"abstract":"Following the 2010 U.S. Supreme Court’s decision on Citizens United v FEC, interest groups engaging in outside spending can receive unlimited contributions from unions and corporations. Critics of the decision have rejected the notion, espoused by the majority opinion, that outside spending does not corrupt or distort the electoral process. Fewer, however, have examined the decision’s implications under the Court’s assumptions. Using a game-theoretic model of electoral competition, we show that informative outside spending from a group whose policy preferences are partially aligned with the electorate may reduce voter welfare. This negative effect is more likely to arise when the value of the interest group’s information is large, or congruence between voters and the interest group is high. Further, the regulatory environment produced by the Court’s decision is inefficient: the electorate would be better off if either outside spending were banned or coordination between candidates and the interest group allowed.","PeriodicalId":415389,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Campaign Finance Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126813958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this Article, Professor Mulroy discusses “strict” open meetings laws applicable in many states to local legislators — laws which restrict substantive discussion of government business even among two or three legislators (far short of a quorum) outside a properly noticed public meeting, and/or which contain no exceptions for sensitive, privacy-invasive topics which might legitimately warrant private deliberation at early stages. Such laws are surprisingly common and broad, and stand in stark contrast to the lack of such restrictions applicable to most state legislators and all federal legislators. Drawing on a novel Fifth Circuit case criticizing such laws, Prof. Mulroy’s prior Tennessee Law Review Article had argued that such laws are overbroad speech restrictions. This new Article draws on a new Fifth Circuit case upholding such laws, and analyzes two relatively new arguments in the defense of such laws. First, this Article argues that such strict “sunshine” laws cannot be defended by analogizing them to campaign finance disclosure laws upheld in the Supreme Court’s Citizens United case and its progeny, because the government interests justifying such disclosure laws do not apply with equal force to strict sunshine rules. In so doing, it discusses the 2014 Supreme Court decision in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission. Second, it argues that such laws are properly analyzed as “content-based” speech restrictions triggering “strict scrutiny” constitutional review. In so doing, the Article discusses the 2014 Supreme Court decision in McCullen v. Oakley. It synthesizes the surprisingly muddled Supreme Court guidance on when to analyze a speech restriction as content-based, criticizes part of the current doctrine on this question, and argues for a straightforward “purely facial” approach which always treats a law as content-based if the law’s application turns on the content of the speech involved. Along the way, it explains many of the counterintuitive, harmful effects of overbroad sunshine laws, including their tendency to chill discussion, hinder compromise, force inappropriate disclosure of sensitive information, breed widespread noncompliance and contempt for the law, and transfer power from legislators to unelected staff and lobbyists.
在这篇文章中，马尔罗伊教授讨论了适用于许多州的地方立法者的“严格的”公开会议法律，这些法律限制了在适当的公开会议之外，甚至在两三个立法者(远低于法定人数)之间对政府事务的实质性讨论，并且/或者对敏感的、侵犯隐私的话题没有例外，这些话题可能合法地要求在早期阶段进行私人审议。这些法律出奇地普遍和广泛，与大多数州立法者和所有联邦立法者缺乏此类限制形成鲜明对比。马尔罗伊教授之前在《田纳西法律评论》上发表的一篇文章，引用了第五巡回法院一个批评此类法律的新案例，认为此类法律是过于宽泛的言论限制。这篇新文章借鉴了一个新的第五巡回法院案例，支持这些法律，并分析了为这些法律辩护的两个相对较新的论点。首先，本文认为，这种严格的“阳光”法律不能与最高法院“联合公民”案及其后续案件中支持的竞选资金披露法相提并论，因为政府利益证明这种披露法的正当性并不等同于严格的阳光规则。在此过程中，它讨论了2014年最高法院对麦卡琴诉联邦选举委员会的裁决。其次，它认为，这些法律被恰当地分析为“基于内容的”言论限制，引发了“严格审查”的宪法审查。在此过程中，本文讨论了2014年最高法院对麦卡伦诉奥克利案(McCullen v. Oakley)的判决。它综合了最高法院关于何时将言论限制分析为基于内容的令人惊讶的混乱的指导意见，批评了目前关于这个问题的部分原则，并主张一种直截了当的“纯粹表面”方法，即如果法律的适用取决于所涉及的言论的内容，则总是将法律视为基于内容的法律。在此过程中，它解释了过于宽泛的阳光法的许多违反直觉的有害影响，包括它们倾向于冷却讨论，阻碍妥协，强迫敏感信息的不当披露，滋生广泛的不遵守和蔑视法律，以及将权力从立法者转移到未经选举的工作人员和游说者手中。
{"title":"Sunshine’s Shadow: Overbroad Open Meetings Laws as Content-Based, Distinct from Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, and Constitutionally Suspect","authors":"Steven J. Mulroy","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2476601","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2476601","url":null,"abstract":"In this Article, Professor Mulroy discusses “strict” open meetings laws applicable in many states to local legislators — laws which restrict substantive discussion of government business even among two or three legislators (far short of a quorum) outside a properly noticed public meeting, and/or which contain no exceptions for sensitive, privacy-invasive topics which might legitimately warrant private deliberation at early stages. Such laws are surprisingly common and broad, and stand in stark contrast to the lack of such restrictions applicable to most state legislators and all federal legislators. Drawing on a novel Fifth Circuit case criticizing such laws, Prof. Mulroy’s prior Tennessee Law Review Article had argued that such laws are overbroad speech restrictions. This new Article draws on a new Fifth Circuit case upholding such laws, and analyzes two relatively new arguments in the defense of such laws. First, this Article argues that such strict “sunshine” laws cannot be defended by analogizing them to campaign finance disclosure laws upheld in the Supreme Court’s Citizens United case and its progeny, because the government interests justifying such disclosure laws do not apply with equal force to strict sunshine rules. In so doing, it discusses the 2014 Supreme Court decision in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission. Second, it argues that such laws are properly analyzed as “content-based” speech restrictions triggering “strict scrutiny” constitutional review. In so doing, the Article discusses the 2014 Supreme Court decision in McCullen v. Oakley. It synthesizes the surprisingly muddled Supreme Court guidance on when to analyze a speech restriction as content-based, criticizes part of the current doctrine on this question, and argues for a straightforward “purely facial” approach which always treats a law as content-based if the law’s application turns on the content of the speech involved. Along the way, it explains many of the counterintuitive, harmful effects of overbroad sunshine laws, including their tendency to chill discussion, hinder compromise, force inappropriate disclosure of sensitive information, breed widespread noncompliance and contempt for the law, and transfer power from legislators to unelected staff and lobbyists.","PeriodicalId":415389,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Campaign Finance Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121571742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The different processes by which state judges are selected is an increasingly popular topic for discussion amongst legal scholars and practitioners. While many law review articles and discussions advocate for one method of judicial selection over the other, this article addresses one specific and significant concern with the elective method: campaign financing. As this article explains, campaign financing can impair judicial independence and inhibit fair and impartial decisions. Fortunately, the appointive system is insulated from the pressures and problems associated with campaign financing, a benefit which is all the more evident today when everyone, including judges, face difficult economic times. More importantly, however, because an appointive system does not involve campaign financing, judicial independence is best preserved in states like Maine where state judges are appointed, rather than elected.
{"title":"Judicial Campaign Financing: An Ever Present Threat to Judicial Independence","authors":"S. Morath","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2214014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2214014","url":null,"abstract":"The different processes by which state judges are selected is an increasingly popular topic for discussion amongst legal scholars and practitioners. While many law review articles and discussions advocate for one method of judicial selection over the other, this article addresses one specific and significant concern with the elective method: campaign financing. As this article explains, campaign financing can impair judicial independence and inhibit fair and impartial decisions. Fortunately, the appointive system is insulated from the pressures and problems associated with campaign financing, a benefit which is all the more evident today when everyone, including judges, face difficult economic times. More importantly, however, because an appointive system does not involve campaign financing, judicial independence is best preserved in states like Maine where state judges are appointed, rather than elected.","PeriodicalId":415389,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Campaign Finance Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123536766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-02-19DOI: 10.11575/SPPP.V2I0.42315
L. Young
Businesses in Calgary are not allowed to contribute so much as a dollar to the campaigns of candidates running for federal office or to any national political parties. Individuals may make a donation to federal candidates, but the amount cannot exceed $1,100; candidates and political parties are also limited in the amount they can spend during an election. After the election, candidates must transfer any surplus funds to a registered party association, where the money will be used for partisan political purposes and is publicly accounted for.
{"title":"Regulating Election Finances in Calgary's Municipal Elections","authors":"L. Young","doi":"10.11575/SPPP.V2I0.42315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11575/SPPP.V2I0.42315","url":null,"abstract":"Businesses in Calgary are not allowed to contribute so much as a dollar to the campaigns of candidates running for federal office or to any national political parties. Individuals may make a donation to federal candidates, but the amount cannot exceed $1,100; candidates and political parties are also limited in the amount they can spend during an election. After the election, candidates must transfer any surplus funds to a registered party association, where the money will be used for partisan political purposes and is publicly accounted for.","PeriodicalId":415389,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Campaign Finance Law & Policy (Topic)","volume":"208 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121194706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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