Common Ownership along the Supply Chain and Supplier Innovations

Xian Chen
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Common owners are the (institutional) investors that hold equities of multiple firms. This paper examines the impact of common ownership of suppliers and customers on suppliers' innovation activities. I find suppliers' investment in innovation, quantity and quality of innovation output increase when common owners control higher fractions of them and their customers. The impact of vertical common ownership on innovation input and quality of innovation output is stronger and more robust than that of horizontal common ownership. I provide plausible evidence for causality using a difference-in-differences approach based on a quasi-natural experiment in the form of financial institution mergers and acquisitions. Moreover, I test the potential channels through which vertical common ownership could influence supplier innovation. My evidence suggests that common ownership increases investment in innovation by mitigating hold-up issues between suppliers and customers, and enhances innovation output performance by improving technological spillovers between suppliers and customers. Overall, my evidence suggests that common institutional ownership enhances suppliers' innovation performance by improving relationships between suppliers and their customers.
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供应链上的共同所有权和供应商创新
普通股所有者是持有多家公司股票的(机构)投资者。本文考察了供应商共同所有权和顾客共同所有权对供应商创新活动的影响。我发现,当共同所有者控制更高比例的供应商及其客户时,供应商在创新方面的投资、创新产出的数量和质量都会增加。纵向公有制对创新投入和创新产出质量的影响比横向公有制更强、更稳健。我利用基于金融机构并购形式的准自然实验的差异中差异方法,为因果关系提供了似是而非的证据。此外,我还测试了垂直共同所有权影响供应商创新的潜在渠道。我的证据表明,共同所有权通过缓解供应商和客户之间的拖延问题来增加对创新的投资,并通过改善供应商和客户之间的技术溢出来提高创新产出绩效。总体而言,我的证据表明,共同的机构所有权通过改善供应商与客户之间的关系来提高供应商的创新绩效。
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