Ploughing the Wrong Furrow

S. Rickard
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Abstract

The precautionary principle provides non-farming interest groups with a pseudo-official means of influencing policy. The result is a drift towards overregulation and regulatory failures which are in conflict with the efficient working of the single market. Official estimates suggest that compliance with existing agricultural regulations amount to £590 million a year in England, representing an increase in total operational costs by a little more than five per cent in England. This significantly underestimates the true cost of regulations because compliance costs do not take into account the longer term, and potentially much larger, costs arising from the impact on competitiveness and the affordability of food. Researchers estimate that overall crop yields would be around half their current levels without the use of crop protection products. Further restrictions on pesticide use would reduce crop yields across the EU and substantially increase the price of food. It is unlikely that the benefits of the current regulatory burden outweigh the costs. The EU’s precautionary approach discourages the development of technologies with even a low, theoretical probability of harm despite offering the likelihood of faster agricultural productivity growth.
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走错了路
预防性原则为非农业利益集团提供了一种影响政策的伪官方手段。其结果是向过度监管和监管失灵的方向发展,这与单一市场的有效运作相冲突。官方估计表明,在英格兰,遵守现行农业法规每年要花费5.9亿英镑,这意味着英格兰的总运营成本增加了5%多一点。这大大低估了法规的真实成本,因为合规成本没有考虑到对食品竞争力和可负担性的影响所产生的长期和潜在的更大成本。研究人员估计,如果不使用作物保护产品,作物总产量将是目前水平的一半左右。对农药使用的进一步限制将降低整个欧盟的作物产量,并大幅提高食品价格。目前监管负担的好处不太可能超过成本。欧盟的预防措施阻碍了技术的发展,即使是理论上的低危害可能性,尽管提供了更快的农业生产力增长的可能性。
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