{"title":"Sharing of Cost Related Information Can Increase Consumer Welfare Under Risk-Aversion","authors":"Murat C. Mungan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2644962","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\nExisting literature suggests that the sharing of firm-specific information related to costs of production among Cournot competitors unambiguously reduces consumer welfare. This article shows that this result does not hold when at least one firm is risk-averse. Perhaps more importantly, if consumers are sufficiently risk-averse allowing information sharing leads to a Pareto improvement.","PeriodicalId":133015,"journal":{"name":"Florida State University Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Florida State University Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2644962","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
Existing literature suggests that the sharing of firm-specific information related to costs of production among Cournot competitors unambiguously reduces consumer welfare. This article shows that this result does not hold when at least one firm is risk-averse. Perhaps more importantly, if consumers are sufficiently risk-averse allowing information sharing leads to a Pareto improvement.