Uncovering Hidden Instructions in Armv8-A Implementations

Fredrik Strupe, Rakesh Kumar
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

Though system and application level security has received and continue to receive significant attention, interest in hardware security has spiked only in the last few years. The majority of recently disclosed hardware security attacks exploit well known and documented hardware behaviours such as speculation, cache and memory timings, etc. We observe that security exploits in undocumented hardware behaviour can have even more severe consequences as such behaviour is rarely verified and protected against. This paper introduces armshaker, a tool to uncover one such undocumented behaviour in the Armv8 architecture, namely hidden instructions. These are the instructions that are not documented in the ISA reference manual, but still execute successfully. We tested five different Armv8-A hardware platforms from four different vendors, as well as two Armv8-A emulators, and uncovered multiple hidden instructions. An interesting finding is that, though we did not discover any hidden instruction in the hardware itself, bugs in the system software can induce hidden instructions in the system that, from a user’s perspective, are indistinguishable from hidden instructions in hardware. Though armshaker did not find any hidden instruction in the hardware of the tested platforms, their existence cannot be ruled out, given the diversity of available Arm processors. Consequently, we make armshaker publicly available as open-source software to enable users to audit their own systems for hidden instructions.
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揭示Armv8-A实现中的隐藏指令
尽管系统和应用程序级别的安全性已经并将继续受到极大的关注,但对硬件安全性的兴趣只是在最近几年才激增。最近披露的大多数硬件安全攻击都利用了众所周知的硬件行为,如推测、缓存和内存计时等。我们观察到,未记录的硬件行为中的安全漏洞可能会产生更严重的后果,因为这种行为很少得到验证和保护。本文介绍了armshaker,这是一个揭露Armv8架构中未记录行为的工具,即隐藏指令。这些指令没有在ISA参考手册中记录,但仍然可以成功执行。我们测试了来自四个不同供应商的五种不同的Armv8-A硬件平台,以及两个Armv8-A模拟器,并发现了多个隐藏指令。一个有趣的发现是,虽然我们没有在硬件本身发现任何隐藏指令,但系统软件中的bug会导致系统中的隐藏指令,从用户的角度来看,这些隐藏指令与硬件中的隐藏指令无法区分。虽然armshaker没有在测试平台的硬件中发现任何隐藏指令,但考虑到可用的Arm处理器的多样性,不能排除它们存在的可能性。因此,我们将armshaker作为开源软件公开提供,使用户能够审计他们自己的系统中隐藏的指令。
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