Inside Source: The Causes and Consequences of Intelligence Infiltration in Civil Wars

Abstract

What explains intelligence success in civil wars? Specifically, when and why do states succeed in cultivating intelligence sources within the adversary side? Such sources provide precious insight into the enemy’s thinking. I find that the dominant framework for information provision in civil war, in which controlling territory yields information, is inapplicable to intelligence infiltration of armed groups. I develop a theory that instead points to the necessity of expertise in identifying disgruntled insurgents, as well as trust on the part of prospective agents that counterinsurgents can maintain secrecy. I draw on ample documentation of U.S. and South Vietnamese intelligence efforts during three periods in the Vietnam War to probe the plausibility of these explanations. I find substantial support for my explanation. I also offer an account of the causes and consequences of the most spectacular intelligence penetration of the war for the United States. A single mid-level Viet Cong cadre spying for the CIA influenced U.S. knowledge of Communist intentions and capabilities from his formal recruitment in 1969 until the end of the war and the agent’s death in captivity in April 1975. I discuss the applicability of these findings to other civil war contexts, including contemporary U.S. interventions.