Truthmaking, Satisfaction and the Force-Content Distinction

Abstract

This paper presents a novel perspective on the force-content distinction against the background of truthmaker semantics and an ontology of attitudinal objects, entities that we refer to as ‘claims’, ‘beliefs’, ‘requests’, ‘offers’, ‘desires’, ‘hopes’, and ‘decisions’ and that are neither acts (or states) nor propositions. Attitudinal objects incorporate illocutionary force or attitudinal mode and come with various sorts of satisfaction conditions, reflected in the applicability of different satisfaction predicates. Various linguistic generalizations support the view that attitudinal objects, rather than propositions, play a central role in the semantics of attitude reports. Making use of Fine’s (2017, 2018a, b) recent truthmaker semantics, the paper outlines an account of force/mode in terms of conditions on the satisfiers of attitudinal objects or on attitudinal objects themselves. Those conditions concern the type of entities that may act as satisfiers (situations, actions, states, (assertoric) attitudinal objects), the presence or absence of violators, causal connections between attitudinal object and satisfiers, and, importantly, the direction of fit. The paper gives a novel account of the notion of direction of fit, motivated by the actual readings of the predicate correct when applied to attitudinal objects or their satisfiers: an attitudinal object with a word/mind-world direction of fit is associated with an intrinsic (non-action-guiding) norm (that of truth); attitudinal objects with a world-word/mind direction of fit impose an action-guiding norm or a purpose on potential satisfiers.