Cities as Lobbyists

Abstract

In the United States, state-local relations are characterized by increasing urban-rural polarization, and several states have recently engaged in high-profile preemption efforts that seek to limit local power. But cities aren’t powerless when it comes to shaping the political environment in which they operate. In fact, local governments are among the most active lobbyists in state politics. When and why do some local officials choose to hire lobbyists to represent them in other levels of government? How does this ability to pay for representation influence politics and policymaking? And what are the broader implications for intergovernmental representation? This chapter previews a theory of municipal lobbying that emphasizes political geography and outlines the structure and organization of the book. It also introduces the qualitative and quantitative data from dozens of sources that will be used throughout the book—including newly compiled longitudinal data on lobbying disclosures in all fifty states.