Exploring Municipal Mobilization across States

Julia Payson
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Abstract

This chapter zooms out to examine the state-level features that are associated with differences in the intensity of local government lobbying. Several state characteristics correlate with municipal lobbying, such as local property tax limitations, but two of the most striking are the combination of term limits and the level of professionalization in the state legislature. Cities are also more likely to mobilize as state transfers comprise a greater share of municipal budgets. These findings suggest that lobbyists might be particularly useful at facilitating representation in complex legislative environments with high turnover among elected officials—especially when cities depend on the state for revenue.
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探索各州的市政动员
本章进一步考察与地方政府游说强度差异相关的州级特征。一些州的特点与市政游说有关,比如地方财产税限制,但最引人注目的两个是任期限制和州立法机构专业化水平的结合。城市也更有可能动员起来,因为国家转移支付在市政预算中所占的份额更大。这些发现表明,在复杂的立法环境中,游说者在促进代表方面可能特别有用,因为民选官员的流动率很高,尤其是当城市依赖州政府的收入时。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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Conclusion Cities as Lobbyists Who Gets What? City Lobbying and State Transfers Exploring Municipal Mobilization across States How City Lobbyists Bridge Representational Gaps
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