Global and Memory Skepticism

Abstract

This chapter begins by briefly considering some direct arguments for global skepticism (according to which none of our beliefs are justified) and finding them unacceptable. It then outlines a piecemeal (underdetermination-based) case for global skepticism, which argues that underdetermination problems afflict not only perception but also memory, a priori intuition, introspection, and reasoning, thereby undermining the justification for all of our beliefs. It also explains what’s wrong with self-undermining objections (e.g. Susanna Rinard’s), according to which the conclusion of arguments for global skepticism (i.e. that none of our beliefs are justified) undermines the rationality of belief in the premises of such arguments, thereby neutering their skeptical force. Finally, it lays out an underdetermination argument for memory skepticism and explains why anti-skeptical arguments from our memory evidence to the likely truth of the memory beliefs based on that evidence are unsuccessful. Although a discussion of the underdetermination problems for a priori intuition, introspection, and reasoning is required to complete the presentation of the piecemeal argument for global skepticism, that discussion is postponed until the following chapter.