Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0010
M. Bergmann
This chapter identifies three more potential problems (in addition to the one discussed in Chapter Nine) for the commonsense intuitionist particularist response to radical skepticism laid out in Chapters Six through Eight, and argues that none of these three alleged problems constitutes an insurmountable objection to commonsense anti-skepticism. The first additional problem is the Problem of Ridiculous Beliefs, according to which noninferential anti-skepticism is committed to approving of a way of responding to skepticism even if that way of responding to skepticism were used to defend ridiculous beliefs. The second is the Problem of Irresponsible Beliefs, according to which unperturbed persistence in endorsing beliefs undefended by argument (e.g. perceptual beliefs), in the face of obvious skeptical possibilities, is epistemically irresponsible. The third is the Problem of Anti-skeptical Evidence, which objects to the view (endorsed by the intuitionist particularism laid out in Chapters Six through Eight) that many of our justified beliefs in anti-skeptical propositions are based on good evidence. The worry behind this last alleged problem is that, even if people can have justified belief in anti-skeptical propositions (i.e. propositions that assert the falsity of radical skeptical hypotheses), there are good reasons for concluding that these sorts of beliefs cannot be based on good evidence. The chapter concludes that, after careful examination of all three problems, commonsense intuitionist particularism emerges unscathed.
{"title":"Ridiculous Beliefs, Irresponsible Beliefs, and Anti-skeptical Evidence","authors":"M. Bergmann","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter identifies three more potential problems (in addition to the one discussed in Chapter Nine) for the commonsense intuitionist particularist response to radical skepticism laid out in Chapters Six through Eight, and argues that none of these three alleged problems constitutes an insurmountable objection to commonsense anti-skepticism. The first additional problem is the Problem of Ridiculous Beliefs, according to which noninferential anti-skepticism is committed to approving of a way of responding to skepticism even if that way of responding to skepticism were used to defend ridiculous beliefs. The second is the Problem of Irresponsible Beliefs, according to which unperturbed persistence in endorsing beliefs undefended by argument (e.g. perceptual beliefs), in the face of obvious skeptical possibilities, is epistemically irresponsible. The third is the Problem of Anti-skeptical Evidence, which objects to the view (endorsed by the intuitionist particularism laid out in Chapters Six through Eight) that many of our justified beliefs in anti-skeptical propositions are based on good evidence. The worry behind this last alleged problem is that, even if people can have justified belief in anti-skeptical propositions (i.e. propositions that assert the falsity of radical skeptical hypotheses), there are good reasons for concluding that these sorts of beliefs cannot be based on good evidence. The chapter concludes that, after careful examination of all three problems, commonsense intuitionist particularism emerges unscathed.","PeriodicalId":369089,"journal":{"name":"Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117204572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0003
M. Bergmann
This chapter examines multiple kinds of deductive and nondeductive anti-skeptical arguments from our sensory experience to the likely truth of our perceptual beliefs based on that evidence and finds them all wanting. In the first two sections, it briefly considers deductive anti-skeptical arguments (of the theological and transcendental variety), inductive anti-skeptical arguments from past correlations of sensory experience with true perceptual beliefs based on it, and anti-skeptical arguments based on a priori knowledge of probabilistic principles saying that our sensory evidence for our perceptual beliefs makes probable the truth of those beliefs. In the final three sections, the focus turns to abductive or inference to the best explanation (IBE) arguments, which are currently the most popular anti-skeptical arguments. IBE anti-skeptical arguments conclude that our sensory experience, or some feature of it, is best explained by the truth of our perceptual beliefs. These three sections argue that we lack good reasons for thinking that our sensory experience is better explained by a Standard Hypothesis (saying that the world is approximately as it seems) than by a skeptical hypothesis, such as the hypothesis that a deceptive demon wants to mislead us into falsely believing the world is as it seems.
{"title":"Inferential Anti-skepticism about Perception","authors":"M. Bergmann","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines multiple kinds of deductive and nondeductive anti-skeptical arguments from our sensory experience to the likely truth of our perceptual beliefs based on that evidence and finds them all wanting. In the first two sections, it briefly considers deductive anti-skeptical arguments (of the theological and transcendental variety), inductive anti-skeptical arguments from past correlations of sensory experience with true perceptual beliefs based on it, and anti-skeptical arguments based on a priori knowledge of probabilistic principles saying that our sensory evidence for our perceptual beliefs makes probable the truth of those beliefs. In the final three sections, the focus turns to abductive or inference to the best explanation (IBE) arguments, which are currently the most popular anti-skeptical arguments. IBE anti-skeptical arguments conclude that our sensory experience, or some feature of it, is best explained by the truth of our perceptual beliefs. These three sections argue that we lack good reasons for thinking that our sensory experience is better explained by a Standard Hypothesis (saying that the world is approximately as it seems) than by a skeptical hypothesis, such as the hypothesis that a deceptive demon wants to mislead us into falsely believing the world is as it seems.","PeriodicalId":369089,"journal":{"name":"Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition","volume":"29 10","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120984240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0004
M. Bergmann
This chapter begins by briefly considering some direct arguments for global skepticism (according to which none of our beliefs are justified) and finding them unacceptable. It then outlines a piecemeal (underdetermination-based) case for global skepticism, which argues that underdetermination problems afflict not only perception but also memory, a priori intuition, introspection, and reasoning, thereby undermining the justification for all of our beliefs. It also explains what’s wrong with self-undermining objections (e.g. Susanna Rinard’s), according to which the conclusion of arguments for global skepticism (i.e. that none of our beliefs are justified) undermines the rationality of belief in the premises of such arguments, thereby neutering their skeptical force. Finally, it lays out an underdetermination argument for memory skepticism and explains why anti-skeptical arguments from our memory evidence to the likely truth of the memory beliefs based on that evidence are unsuccessful. Although a discussion of the underdetermination problems for a priori intuition, introspection, and reasoning is required to complete the presentation of the piecemeal argument for global skepticism, that discussion is postponed until the following chapter.
{"title":"Global and Memory Skepticism","authors":"M. Bergmann","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter begins by briefly considering some direct arguments for global skepticism (according to which none of our beliefs are justified) and finding them unacceptable. It then outlines a piecemeal (underdetermination-based) case for global skepticism, which argues that underdetermination problems afflict not only perception but also memory, a priori intuition, introspection, and reasoning, thereby undermining the justification for all of our beliefs. It also explains what’s wrong with self-undermining objections (e.g. Susanna Rinard’s), according to which the conclusion of arguments for global skepticism (i.e. that none of our beliefs are justified) undermines the rationality of belief in the premises of such arguments, thereby neutering their skeptical force. Finally, it lays out an underdetermination argument for memory skepticism and explains why anti-skeptical arguments from our memory evidence to the likely truth of the memory beliefs based on that evidence are unsuccessful. Although a discussion of the underdetermination problems for a priori intuition, introspection, and reasoning is required to complete the presentation of the piecemeal argument for global skepticism, that discussion is postponed until the following chapter.","PeriodicalId":369089,"journal":{"name":"Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124131391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0008
M. Bergmann
This chapter employs the intuitionist particularist approach laid out in Chapters Six and Seven to develop an ecumenical noninferential anti-skeptic’s response to the underdetermination arguments (considered earlier in the book) for radical skepticism about perception, memory, a priori intuition, introspection, and reasoning. The sense in which this response is ecumenical is that it can easily be endorsed by both internalists and externalists in epistemology. The chapter concludes by arguing that, despite the ecumenical nature of this anti-skeptical response to radical skepticism, one lesson of the book so far is that there is a sense in which “externalism” of a certain kind (acceptable to both internalists and externalists alike) wins the day.
{"title":"Ecumenical Noninferential Anti-skepticism","authors":"M. Bergmann","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter employs the intuitionist particularist approach laid out in Chapters Six and Seven to develop an ecumenical noninferential anti-skeptic’s response to the underdetermination arguments (considered earlier in the book) for radical skepticism about perception, memory, a priori intuition, introspection, and reasoning. The sense in which this response is ecumenical is that it can easily be endorsed by both internalists and externalists in epistemology. The chapter concludes by arguing that, despite the ecumenical nature of this anti-skeptical response to radical skepticism, one lesson of the book so far is that there is a sense in which “externalism” of a certain kind (acceptable to both internalists and externalists alike) wins the day.","PeriodicalId":369089,"journal":{"name":"Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131209606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0002
M. Bergmann
This chapter motivates narrowing the book’s focus to a particular kind of argument for perceptual skepticism (the underdetermination argument) and to two main kinds of response to it (inferential anti-skepticism and noninferential anti-skepticism). The first half of the chapter sets aside skeptical arguments (e.g. closure-based arguments) and responses to them (e.g. contextualism, contrastivism, and closure-denial) that overestimate skepticism’s appeal by taking for granted that we don’t know that skeptical hypotheses are false. It also sets aside disjunctivist and “knowledge first” responses to skepticism, both of which underestimate skepticism’s appeal by rejecting the intuitions supporting the New Evil Demon Problem. The second half of the chapter highlights the relative strength of underdetermination arguments for perceptual skepticism, according to which our sensory evidence underdetermines the truth of our perceptual beliefs based on it. This underdetermination problem requires us to be able to infer the likely truth of our perceptual beliefs via good arguments from our sensory evidence, if our perceptual beliefs are to be justified. Given that we aren’t able to make such inferences, the underdetermination argument concludes that our perceptual beliefs aren’t justified. The inferential anti-skeptic’s response insists that we are able to make such inferences. The noninferential anti-skeptic’s response says that, despite the underdetermination problem, our perceptual beliefs can be justified even if we aren’t able to infer their likely truth via good arguments from our sensory evidence.
{"title":"Underdetermination and Perceptual Skepticism","authors":"M. Bergmann","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter motivates narrowing the book’s focus to a particular kind of argument for perceptual skepticism (the underdetermination argument) and to two main kinds of response to it (inferential anti-skepticism and noninferential anti-skepticism). The first half of the chapter sets aside skeptical arguments (e.g. closure-based arguments) and responses to them (e.g. contextualism, contrastivism, and closure-denial) that overestimate skepticism’s appeal by taking for granted that we don’t know that skeptical hypotheses are false. It also sets aside disjunctivist and “knowledge first” responses to skepticism, both of which underestimate skepticism’s appeal by rejecting the intuitions supporting the New Evil Demon Problem. The second half of the chapter highlights the relative strength of underdetermination arguments for perceptual skepticism, according to which our sensory evidence underdetermines the truth of our perceptual beliefs based on it. This underdetermination problem requires us to be able to infer the likely truth of our perceptual beliefs via good arguments from our sensory evidence, if our perceptual beliefs are to be justified. Given that we aren’t able to make such inferences, the underdetermination argument concludes that our perceptual beliefs aren’t justified. The inferential anti-skeptic’s response insists that we are able to make such inferences. The noninferential anti-skeptic’s response says that, despite the underdetermination problem, our perceptual beliefs can be justified even if we aren’t able to infer their likely truth via good arguments from our sensory evidence.","PeriodicalId":369089,"journal":{"name":"Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131391042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0006
M. Bergmann
This chapter lays out an account of the particularist approach to epistemological inquiry and develops a version of it in terms of epistemic intuitions, which are seemings about epistemic value (such as justification or knowledge). It begins by briefly reviewing the history of particularism, from Thomas Reid through G. E. Moore to Roderick Chisholm, and then gives a clear statement of the particularist methodology. The remaining sections elaborate the view, giving pride of place to epistemic intuitions, which is why the resulting view is called ‘intuitionist particularism.’ Particularism in epistemology (which tends to be endorsed by commonsense anti-skeptics) puts more weight on epistemic intuitions about particular cases and which of our beliefs are rational. It stands opposed to methodism, which is typically endorsed by proponents of radical skepticism and puts more weight on epistemic intuitions about principles that say what’s required for a belief to be rational. In their extreme forms, these positions occupy two ends of a spectrum. The position advocated in this chapter is a moderate one that leans toward the particularist end of the spectrum, in a way that is compatible with both internalism and externalism in epistemology.
{"title":"Intuitionist Particularism: An Introduction","authors":"M. Bergmann","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter lays out an account of the particularist approach to epistemological inquiry and develops a version of it in terms of epistemic intuitions, which are seemings about epistemic value (such as justification or knowledge). It begins by briefly reviewing the history of particularism, from Thomas Reid through G. E. Moore to Roderick Chisholm, and then gives a clear statement of the particularist methodology. The remaining sections elaborate the view, giving pride of place to epistemic intuitions, which is why the resulting view is called ‘intuitionist particularism.’ Particularism in epistemology (which tends to be endorsed by commonsense anti-skeptics) puts more weight on epistemic intuitions about particular cases and which of our beliefs are rational. It stands opposed to methodism, which is typically endorsed by proponents of radical skepticism and puts more weight on epistemic intuitions about principles that say what’s required for a belief to be rational. In their extreme forms, these positions occupy two ends of a spectrum. The position advocated in this chapter is a moderate one that leans toward the particularist end of the spectrum, in a way that is compatible with both internalism and externalism in epistemology.","PeriodicalId":369089,"journal":{"name":"Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134409855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0011
M. Bergmann
After briefly considering (in Section 1) the self-undermining worry that arguments for skepticism about epistemic intuition themselves rely on epistemic intuition, this chapter responds to underdetermination-based arguments for skepticism about epistemic intuition. Section 2 lays out the rationale for underdetermination-based skepticism about epistemic intuition and presents the noninferential anti-skeptic’s response. Section 3 highlights the epistemic circularity that is so obvious in that response and explains why, instead of causing trouble for that response, it provides us with a paradigm case of unproblematic epistemic circularity. Section 4 identifies several worries about the possibility of our having duplicates who are victims of deceptive demons (worries connected with disjunctivism, the New Evil Demon Problem, and the positions defended in Sections 2 and 3), and responds to the alleged problems these worries cause for epistemic intuition.
{"title":"Epistemic Intuition and Underdetermination","authors":"M. Bergmann","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"After briefly considering (in Section 1) the self-undermining worry that arguments for skepticism about epistemic intuition themselves rely on epistemic intuition, this chapter responds to underdetermination-based arguments for skepticism about epistemic intuition. Section 2 lays out the rationale for underdetermination-based skepticism about epistemic intuition and presents the noninferential anti-skeptic’s response. Section 3 highlights the epistemic circularity that is so obvious in that response and explains why, instead of causing trouble for that response, it provides us with a paradigm case of unproblematic epistemic circularity. Section 4 identifies several worries about the possibility of our having duplicates who are victims of deceptive demons (worries connected with disjunctivism, the New Evil Demon Problem, and the positions defended in Sections 2 and 3), and responds to the alleged problems these worries cause for epistemic intuition.","PeriodicalId":369089,"journal":{"name":"Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131982933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0007
M. Bergmann
This chapter elucidates and defends intuitionist particularism, which is introduced in Chapter Six. Sections 1 and 2 focus on seemings, elucidating the nature of epistemic intuitions understood as seemings and defending the reliance of intuitionist particularism on seemings. These sections present a detailed account of what seemings are and respond to various objections to seemings playing a role in philosophical work. Sections 3 and 4 elucidate the goal of the intuitionist particularist response to radical skepticism (noting that it is not intended to convert the skeptic) and defend the respectability of that commonsense response against the charges that it fails to engage the skeptic or to take radical skepticism seriously.
{"title":"Intuitionist Particularism: Elucidations and Defenses","authors":"M. Bergmann","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter elucidates and defends intuitionist particularism, which is introduced in Chapter Six. Sections 1 and 2 focus on seemings, elucidating the nature of epistemic intuitions understood as seemings and defending the reliance of intuitionist particularism on seemings. These sections present a detailed account of what seemings are and respond to various objections to seemings playing a role in philosophical work. Sections 3 and 4 elucidate the goal of the intuitionist particularist response to radical skepticism (noting that it is not intended to convert the skeptic) and defend the respectability of that commonsense response against the charges that it fails to engage the skeptic or to take radical skepticism seriously.","PeriodicalId":369089,"journal":{"name":"Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121609638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0012
M. Bergmann
This chapter examines skeptical objections to epistemic intuition that are based on disagreement. Section 1 distinguishes internal from external rationality in order to facilitate our understanding and analysis of the epistemology of disagreement. Section 2 lays out a variety of kinds of disagreement with respect to epistemic intuition. Section 3 explains why disagreement gives rise to a defeater in cases where it is not rational to view the one disagreeing with you as a person with worse evidence than you or as a person who is worse than you at responding well to evidence. Section 4 considers, in light of the previous sections, whether the intuitionist particularist anti-skeptic’s beliefs based on epistemic intuition can withstand disagreement-based skeptical objections in a way that is compatible with the requirements of intellectual humility. Section 5 works through the implications of disagreement about the proposed response (in Section 4) to disagreement about epistemic intuition.
{"title":"Epistemic Intuition and Disagreement","authors":"M. Bergmann","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines skeptical objections to epistemic intuition that are based on disagreement. Section 1 distinguishes internal from external rationality in order to facilitate our understanding and analysis of the epistemology of disagreement. Section 2 lays out a variety of kinds of disagreement with respect to epistemic intuition. Section 3 explains why disagreement gives rise to a defeater in cases where it is not rational to view the one disagreeing with you as a person with worse evidence than you or as a person who is worse than you at responding well to evidence. Section 4 considers, in light of the previous sections, whether the intuitionist particularist anti-skeptic’s beliefs based on epistemic intuition can withstand disagreement-based skeptical objections in a way that is compatible with the requirements of intellectual humility. Section 5 works through the implications of disagreement about the proposed response (in Section 4) to disagreement about epistemic intuition.","PeriodicalId":369089,"journal":{"name":"Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125663253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0009
M. Bergmann
This chapter argues that the commonsense intuitionist particularist response to radical skepticism laid out in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight does not fall prey to the Problem of Easy Knowledge, which can also be called the ‘Problem of Epistemic Circularity.’ The core concern here is that one can’t rationally rely on a belief source to justify the belief that that very belief source is trustworthy or reliable because that would be too easy, as well as circular. The chapter concedes that this sort of epistemic circularity is often problematic, yet argues that this is not true in general, but only in certain specified circumstances. It explains how epistemic circularity (which is disparaged largely on the basis of intuitions) can be defended both by arguments and by intuitions. And it uses these defenses to respond to the Problem of Easy Knowledge and Epistemic Circularity and to explain why it seems threatening even though it isn’t.
{"title":"Easy Knowledge and Epistemic Circularity","authors":"M. Bergmann","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898487.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that the commonsense intuitionist particularist response to radical skepticism laid out in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight does not fall prey to the Problem of Easy Knowledge, which can also be called the ‘Problem of Epistemic Circularity.’ The core concern here is that one can’t rationally rely on a belief source to justify the belief that that very belief source is trustworthy or reliable because that would be too easy, as well as circular. The chapter concedes that this sort of epistemic circularity is often problematic, yet argues that this is not true in general, but only in certain specified circumstances. It explains how epistemic circularity (which is disparaged largely on the basis of intuitions) can be defended both by arguments and by intuitions. And it uses these defenses to respond to the Problem of Easy Knowledge and Epistemic Circularity and to explain why it seems threatening even though it isn’t.","PeriodicalId":369089,"journal":{"name":"Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132438735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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