{"title":"The Research of Conduct Security Management Based on Evolutionary Game Theory","authors":"Li Meiling, Liu Yachen, Liu Ning","doi":"10.1109/ICEE.2010.227","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The paper establishes the evolutionary game model of conduct security management, and analysis its strategies’ choice about the interaction between the government and the construction enterprises. In order to enhance the construction security management, the paper also analyzes the evolution of the relevant parties to the dynamic process of the game, and finally gives the optimal strategy of both sides.","PeriodicalId":420284,"journal":{"name":"2010 International Conference on E-Business and E-Government","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2010 International Conference on E-Business and E-Government","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICEE.2010.227","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The paper establishes the evolutionary game model of conduct security management, and analysis its strategies’ choice about the interaction between the government and the construction enterprises. In order to enhance the construction security management, the paper also analyzes the evolution of the relevant parties to the dynamic process of the game, and finally gives the optimal strategy of both sides.