Exploring the Tenure - Democracy Nexus on Customary Land Right Holders

Abstract

In Zimbabwe, as in many African countries, land remains a basic strategic asset for those who live in the rural areas. Particularly, for those people in customary tenured areas, access to land is negotiated through identity. Most Zimbabweans either live or have land rights in customary tenure areas. Here, land is not a commodity that can be traded nor is it regarded as an individual asset. Disputes related to access, ownership and use of customary tenure land are handled in traditional courts presided over by chiefs and their subordinate structures. Those who dwell in customary tenure areas have no direct relationship with civil courts, where private property disputes are resolved, but instead, must go through the traditional courts. In one of my earlier publications, I have argued that the involvement of traditional courts in customary land tenure issues is the hallmark of classical citizenship. While I continue to proffer this argument in the current study, the study also illustrates how traditional authority has, over the years become an appendage of the state through strategic measures which include salaries for chiefs, vehicles, rural electrification, and power that comes with being entrusted with the role of distributing subsidies. Additionally, the exclusion of customary tenure areas from formal financial services means that households are at the mercy of government led subsidies which are steeped within the political interests of the ruling party ZANU-PF. In many cases, government subsidies end up being used as incentive to support the incumbent party. In such instances, elected officeholders take the lead in the distribution of these subsidies. The relationship between land tenure and democracy is perhaps the most compelling for reforms, but rarely discussed. In this study I expand on my previous interventions by arguing that the ways in which land is held in customary tenure areas and the existing subsidy regimes have played a critical role in restricting rural residents’ autonomy to make autonomous political choices. I further argue that the autonomy to choose is mostly compromised in contexts where access to productive resources such as land, markets, mechanical, financial, and physical capital are negotiated through subservience to traditional authorities who are politically affiliated.