Leibniz’s Ontology of Force

Abstract

Leibniz portrays the most fundamental entities in his mature ontology in at least three different ways: (a) mind-like, immaterial substances that perceive and strive, (b) hylomorphic compounds, (c) primitive and derivative forces. This chapter argues that the third characterization is more accurate than the other two. Thus, Leibniz’s monadological metaphysics is even more radical than it initially seems: his ontology is best understood not as a substance-mode ontology but as a force ontology. At the metaphysical ground floor, we do not find substances that possess force; instead, we just find forces. Interpreting Leibniz as a force ontologist has far-reaching consequences. For instance, it requires us to reconsider the status of time in Leibniz’s system and to revise our understanding of appetitions (or appetites) and perceptions.