Efficiency, Fairness, and the Economic Analysis of Tort Law

Mark A. Geistfeld
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

Throughout its history, the economic analysis of tort law has been largely limited to one question: How should tort rules be formulated so as to minimize the social cost of accidents? Throughout its history, the economic analysis of tort law has also been controversial. The two phenomena are related. It is highly controversial whether tort law should minimize accident costs to the exclusion of fairness concerns, which in turn has fostered the belief that the economic analysis of tort law is controversial.The most forceful critique has come from those who maintain that tort liability is best justified by the principle of corrective justice. This principle is based on an individual right that imposes an obligation or duty on another individual. A duty-holder who violates the correlative right has committed a wrong, creating a duty to repair or correct any wrongful losses suffered by the right-holder. This rights-based principle of justice purportedly rules out the economic analysis of tort law. Such sweeping claims about the irrelevancy of economic analysis must be understood in context. If the appropriate rationale for tort liability is a rights-based principle such as corrective justice, then the justification for a liability rule does not depend on whether it is allocatively efficient. Economic analysis is “ruled out” for being irrelevant to the rights-based justification for tort liability. Allocative efficiency does not need to be the norm of tort liability in order to make economic analysis relevant. Economic analysis is not limited to issues of allocative efficiency and cost minimization. It is an open question whether a rights-based tort system would employ economic analysis, and if so, how.To address this question, I specify the substantive content of an autonomy-based, individual right that is both allocatively inefficient and fully compatible with the relevant requirements of welfare economics. As I have argued at length elsewhere, such a right also provides a good description of tort law. Thus, the idea that economic analysis is incompatible with or irrelevant to a rights-based principle of justice is mistaken. I conclude by arguing that economic analysis is integral to any plausible rights-based tort system.
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效率、公平与侵权法的经济学分析
纵观其历史,侵权法的经济分析在很大程度上局限于一个问题:如何制定侵权规则以使事故的社会成本最小化?纵观其历史,侵权法的经济分析也一直存在争议。这两种现象是相互关联的。侵权法是否应该在排除公平考虑的情况下最大限度地减少事故成本,这是一个非常有争议的问题,这反过来又促进了侵权法的经济分析是有争议的。最有力的批评来自那些坚持认为侵权责任最好由纠正性正义原则来证明的人。这一原则是建立在个人权利的基础上的,这种权利对另一个人施加了义务或责任。侵犯相关权利的义务人犯了错误,就产生了赔偿或纠正权利人所遭受的不正当损失的义务。这种以权利为基础的正义原则据称排除了侵权法的经济分析。这种关于经济分析无关紧要的笼统主张,必须放在大背景中理解。如果侵权责任的适当理由是一种基于权利的原则,如纠正正义,那么责任规则的正当性并不取决于它是否具有配置效率。经济分析因与侵权责任的权利正当性无关而被“排除在外”。配置效率不需要成为侵权责任的规范,以使经济分析具有相关性。经济分析并不局限于分配效率和成本最小化的问题。一个以权利为基础的侵权制度是否会运用经济分析,如果运用,如何运用,这是一个悬而未决的问题。为了解决这个问题,我详细说明了以自治为基础的个人权利的实质内容,这种权利在分配上是低效的,而且完全符合福利经济学的相关要求。正如我在其他地方详细论述的那样,这种权利也为侵权法提供了一个很好的描述。因此,认为经济分析与以权利为基础的正义原则不相容或无关的观点是错误的。最后,我认为经济分析对于任何合理的基于权利的侵权制度都是不可或缺的。
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