Schopenhauer’s Pessimism in Light of His Evolving System

Abstract

This chapter argues that the pessimistic doctrine that Schopenhauer does espouse is that (a) there is a preponderance of undeserved suffering in the world; (b) this is an extremely bad-making feature of existence that is not outweighed by any good-making features; and (c) this situation cannot get substantially better in time. The metaphysical and empirical reasons he adduces to support this pessimistic doctrine are then investigated. Ultimately, the chapter argues that the grounds for his pessimism are weak and become weaker as his philosophy develops in light of proto-Darwinian thought from 1818 to 1859. Two facets of this development are especially salient: First, Schopenhauer comes to rely less on the Platonic Ideas to explain the fixity of species and instead embraces proto-Darwinian evolutionary theory. This change has important ramifications for Schopenhauer’s system that he never works out. One of these is that from within Schopenhauer’s mature system, there emerge some grounds for hope that the human (and even non-human animal) condition can get significantly better. Second, Schopenhauer emphasizes more in his later work (WWR II) the hermeneutic nature of his metaphysics. Given the sort of metaphysical methodology he embraces, the identification of thing-in-itself with will cannot be used in a foundationalist manner, by the lights of his own theorizing, to support pessimism by demonstrating that the world cannot get substantially better. His hermeneutic metaphysics must always be responsive to the empirical evidence, and there may be actual evidence of progress.