{"title":"Complex Systems, Competition/Antitrust, and Legal Problems in the Global Credit Rating Agency Industry","authors":"","doi":"10.4018/978-1-7998-7418-8.ch008","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explains how the tie-breaker effect reduces social welfare and distorts equilibria. This chapter introduces new definitions of “equilibrium” in the CRA ratings processes. (This has been one of the major missing elements in the existing literature on the credit ratings industry) It explains why “reputational capital” (of CRAs) is a sub-set of “influence” (which can have more impact on bond-issuers' decisions and investors' decisions than traditional “influence”) and critiques the games theorems in Virag and other important papers.","PeriodicalId":129265,"journal":{"name":"Complex Systems and Sustainability in the Global Auditing, Consulting, and Credit Rating Agency Industries","volume":"102 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Complex Systems and Sustainability in the Global Auditing, Consulting, and Credit Rating Agency Industries","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-7418-8.ch008","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This chapter explains how the tie-breaker effect reduces social welfare and distorts equilibria. This chapter introduces new definitions of “equilibrium” in the CRA ratings processes. (This has been one of the major missing elements in the existing literature on the credit ratings industry) It explains why “reputational capital” (of CRAs) is a sub-set of “influence” (which can have more impact on bond-issuers' decisions and investors' decisions than traditional “influence”) and critiques the games theorems in Virag and other important papers.