Knowledge Sharing and Learning Among Smallholders in Developing Economies: Implications, Incentives, and Reward Mechanisms

Shihong Xiao, Ying‐ju Chen, Christopher S. Tang
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引用次数: 21

Abstract

In developing economies, smallholders use their private knowledge and exert costly effort to control their output of high quality (and low quality) crop so as to maximize profit. To improve farmers' productivity, NGOs and governments are advocating various knowledge sharing and learning platforms so that farmers can share with and learn from each other about various farming techniques. Putting altruism aside, we examine the economic implications for heterogeneous farmers to share their private farming knowledge voluntarily with other farmers under (implicit) competition. By analyzing a multi-person sequential game, we provide a plausible reason to explain why (and conditions under which) knowledge sharing can be beneficial even when each farmer's profit depends on the total output. We find that the voluntary knowledge shared level is always lower than or equal to the "first best" knowledge shared level that maximizes the farmer welfare under centralized control. This finding motivates us to develop a reward mechanism to entice farmers to increase their knowledge shared level in a decentralized system so as to maximize the farmer welfare and reduce income inequality. Upon examining different mechanisms, we establish a quota-based reward mechanism that can entice farmers to share their knowledge up to the first-best level voluntarily.
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发展中经济体小农之间的知识共享和学习:影响、激励和奖励机制
在发展中经济体,小农利用他们的私人知识并付出昂贵的努力来控制高质量(和低质量)作物的产量,从而实现利润最大化。为了提高农民的生产力,非政府组织和政府正在倡导各种知识共享和学习平台,使农民能够相互分享和学习各种农业技术。撇开利他主义不谈,我们考察了异质性农民在(隐性)竞争下自愿与其他农民分享其私人农业知识的经济含义。通过分析一个多人序列博弈,我们提供了一个合理的理由来解释为什么(以及在什么条件下)知识共享即使在每个农民的利润取决于总产量的情况下也是有益的。我们发现,在集中控制下,农民的自愿知识共享水平总是小于或等于使农民福利最大化的“最优”知识共享水平。这一发现促使我们开发一种奖励机制,以吸引农民在分散系统中提高他们的知识共享水平,从而最大化农民福利,减少收入不平等。在考察不同机制的基础上,我们建立了一种基于配额的奖励机制,可以吸引农民自愿分享他们的知识,达到最优水平。
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