Research on Incentive Mechanism of Knowledge Sharing among Teams in Enterprise

Abstract

In modern enterprise, project team has become a much more effective form for its flexible, problem-oriented and task-oriented. Knowledge sharing among teams plays a significant role in knowledge management of enterprise. Based on principal-agent theory, this paper explores the benefit game between enterprise and project team under information asymmetry condition, introduces both knowledge value and excess reward into knowledge sharing incentive model framework, and analyzes the impact of diverse parameters (e.g. knowledge value coefficient, standard knowledge value coefficient of enterprise, effort cost coefficient, absolute risk aversion coefficient et al.) on incentive intensity, expected revenue of enterprise and agent cost of project team. Mathematical analysis results show that the optimal incentive contract is determined when both sides reach the stable equilibrium state. If the parameters change, enterprise will simultaneously adjust the incentive strategy, and the optimal action of project team will accordingly vary to maximize bilateral benefits.